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In this Article, Doctor Abraham studies the tensions between individual rights and
theoriesof collective action in the context of union membership resignationsandstrikebreaking. He argues that recentjudicial and executive tendencies to value individual
worker autonomy over collective union action are misguided, lacking a basis in both
legal precedent and social reality. In support of his view, Abrahamfirst explores the
philosophicaland historical-sociologicalroots of labor and labor-capitalrelations,focusing on the meaning of employment and the history of collective action. Next, he
examines the social and legal origins of the judiciary's recent tendency to increase
union members' resignation andstrikebreakingrights at the expense of union solidarity andstrength. DoctorAbraham concludes that in oursystem of voluntary unionism,
courts must uphold laborsolidarityrights in order to permit labor law to function atall
and to afford otherwisepowerless workers the possibility of developing as truly autonomous individuals.
CONTENTS

Introduction ...................................................
I. Labor, Collective Action, Empowerment, and the Law ......
A. Social Reality and Labor Law .........................
1. What Does Labor Law Do? ........................
2. Abstract Freedom and Concrete Dependency .......
B. Collective Identity and Collective Action ...............
1. People and Things: Production and Exchange ......
2. Capitalist Democracy: Employers and Workers .....
C. Making Cement from Sand ............................
1. Community and Culture ...........................
2. The Industrial Legal Order and Legislative Intent...
D. Unions in the Industrial Legal Order ..................

1. What Do Unions Do in the System? ....

. .. . . . .. . . . .

2. How May Unions Be Able to Do It? ....

.. . . . .. . . . .

1269
1277
1277
1277
1280
1283
1283
1286
1290
1290
1293
1297

1297
1301

* B.A., 1968, M.A., 1972, Ph.D., 1977, University of Chicago; formerly Assistant Professor of History, Princeton University; Visiting Associate Professor of History, New School for
Social Research; J.D. Candidate, 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
I would like to thank the following colleagues, old and new, for their insightful comments
and stimulating criticisms: Regina Austin, Michael Burawoy, Drucilla Cornell, Gerry
Neuman, Clyde Summers, Manfred Weiss, and especially Joel Rogers. The diversity of their
perspectives has helped enrich my own and pointed to the massive tasks before us.

1268

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 1988]

UNION RESIGNATIONS

Empowerment and Autonomy in the Courts: Resignation
and Strikebreaking .........................................
A. Whittling Down the Meaning of Membership ..........
1. The Allis-Chalmers Starting Point ..................
2. Turning Allis-Chalmers on Its Head ................
a. "Legitimate" Internal Affairs: Marine Workers
and Scofield ....................................
b. The Declining Value of One's Word: Granite
State and Booster Lodge ........................
B. The Accelerated Assault on Solidarity: The Union as
Subjugator and What to Do About It ..................
1. Facilitating Resignations, Weakening Unions .......
2. Ideas and Interests in the New Economy: Principles
and Policies .......................................
a. A Capitalist Crisis and an Employer Offensive...
b. The NLRB Offensive to 1980: Precarious
Balance ........................................
c. Post-1980 Onslaught: Dalmo Victor I-The
Board Rebuffed ................................
d. Neufeld Porsche-Audi: The Courts Rebuffed, the
Lines Drawn ...................................
3. Closing the Circle: The Pattern Makers Outcome ...
4. The Board Vindicated? ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Toward Reasonable Exit Timing ...................
Conclusion .....................................................
A. Resignations ..........................................
B. Post-Resignation Strikebreaking ........................

II.

1304
1304
1304
1309
1309
1311
1315
1316
1319
1319
1321
1323
1326
1328
1331
1334
1337
1337
1338

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by
'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action
has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.
Max Weber1
INTRODUCTION

Two of the central goals of American law, politics, and social life
are, on the one hand, the furtherance of individual autonomy even in the
midst of the public sphere, and, on the other hand, the facilitation of
group formation and collective empowerment even in individual contracting. Yet, the law has rarely looked on these two goals either equally
1 M. Weber, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in From Max Weber 280 (H.
Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1946).
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or blindly, nearly always placing individual autonomy and responsibility
above collective empowerment. To contest individualist notions,
whether in the civil or criminal sphere, competing views, such as strict
liability or class action, must demonstrate an indisputable and vital social
benefit.
In few areas are the resulting disparities more evident than in the
judicial treatment of labor law. In recent years tensions and disparities
have developed in the bitter realm of union membership resignations and
attendant strikebreaking as courts have increasingly favored individual
interests over the collective interests represented by unions.
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB 2
held that, according to the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or the
NLRA), 3 a union may not fine a union member who resigns from the
union during a lawful strike and then breaks the strike by returning to
work. The Court reached this conclusion despite an explicit stipulation
in the democratically adopted union bylaws that resignation immediately
before or during the course of a strike was not permitted,4 and despite the
fact that the union member who resigned participated in the original
strike vote.5 The Court developed the theory that, as a voluntary member of a semi-public but voluntary organization, a union member is free
to go whenever he wishes, and his exit ends union control over him.6
2 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
4 See PatternMakers, 473 U.S. at 100. The bylaw in question, League Law 13, read as
follows: "No resignation or withdrawal from an Association [local], or from the League [international], shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout
appears imminent." Id. at 97. The union adopted this provision in 1976; a strike ensued the
next year against the employers, who were represented by the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association. Id. at 97-98.
5 Id. at 99.
6 Id. at 102-03. After the strike in question, the local union informed the eleven members
who had tendered resignations during the strike and crossed the picket lines to work for the
struck employer that their resignations had been rejected. The union then sought to fine these
workers for returning to work. Subsequently, the employer's representatives filed unfair labor
practice charges against the union, urging the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or
the Board) to construe League Law 13 as a § 8(b)(1) (A) violation of the employees' § 7 rights.
Id. at 97-98.
Section 7 of the NLRA in pertinent part reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain
or oerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]: Provided, That
this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
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Neither the availability of democratic mechanisms for voicing dissent
within the union, 7 nor the possibility of winning over one's fellows either
to change the bylaws or to end the strike,8 nor even the possibility of
displacing the current union 9 can obviate an individual's freedom simply
to bail out of the union and break the strike when he considers it necessary or desirable. 10 The Court thus rejected and ultimately overruled the
logic articulated by the Ninth Circuit in a similar, earlier case, Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) v. NLRB. I I That court had ruled that
an employee who elects full union membership, if fairly represented and
accorded the right to vote on officers and rules, including the right to

vote on whether to strike, may be bound by those decisions and unable to
exit at will.' 2
Much of the legal commentary on the Pattern Makers decision has
deemed it a significant victory for individual worker choice over union
coercion, and, therefore, a successful reaffirmation of the nation's commitment to voluntary unionism in particular, and free individualism in
general.13 Indeed, from the "classical" liberal perspective of a universe
(1982).
The Board entered an order on behalf of the employer's position, upholding the resignations and striking down the union's fines. Pattern Makers' League, 265 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1982).
Challenged by the union, the Board's order was enforced by the Seventh Circuit, Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983), shortly before the Ninth Circuit rendered
its own diametrically opposed judgment. See Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) v.
NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901, rev'd on remand, 773 F.2d 1070
(9th Cir. 1985); text accompanying note 11 infra.
7 See generally Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 401-531 (1982 & Supp. 111984) (legislation intended to provide the means of ensuring free
and democratic union elections without unnecessary governmental interference with internal
union affairs). For the particular sections of the Act that provide union members with an
extensive "bill of rights," see id. §§ 411(a)1-5, 481-483.
8 The courts have consistently recognized and reaffirmed a broad range of members' rights
in this area. See Parker v. Steelworkers Local 1466, 642 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1981) (right to
advocate and consider returning to work at strike meeting); Keubler v. Cleveland Lithographers & Photoengravers Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1973) (right to meet and
discuss dissatisfaction with progress of settlement talks and to form dissident caucus); Bauman
v. Presser, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2393, 2398-99 (D.D.C. 1984) (right to "informed and meaningful vote" includes informed debate before voting).
9 Airline Maintenance Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk, 444 F.2d 719, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1971)
(members may not be fined for seeking to replace incumbent union with rival union).
10 A worker practically or philosophically opposed to a strike enjoys additional options as
well. He may refuse to become a fall member of the union in the first place; he may resign
before the onset of the strike; and he may, of course, go to work for a different employer. The
Pattern Makers Court did not seriously examine the union member's opportunities to criticize
union actions or to mobilize efforts aimed at reform or replacement of the union.
11725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901, rev'd on remand, 773 F.2d 1070
(9th Cir. 1985).
12 Id. at 1218 (union members "may not betray their colleagues and expect to get away
without paying a price").
13 See, e.g., Recent Developments, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 260, 263 (1986). There, the
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populated by isolated individuals whose rights constitute a zero sum and
whose relationships with each other are purely contractual and instrumental, Pattern Makers makes good sense and good law. It fits into the
best tradition of negative rights grounded in the atomized individual's
14
fear and distrust of others.
In this Article, I will argue that such a view is seriously mistaken.
Because that classical liberal perspective is simultaneously inadequate
and oppressive, Pattern Makers, and the series of cases culminating in
it,15 cannot and should not stand the test of time. Beyond their philosophical inadequacy, they are political initiatives cast on the legal waters
by a "unidimensional" National Labor Relations Board 16 and enjoy an
insufficient foundation in precedent, statute, and social reality. Pattern
Makers was also a close case, decided five-to-four, with a pivotal separate
concurrence based solely on deference to the Board.' 7 All told, it is a
decision that invites scrutiny and revision.
It should nevertheless be acknowledged from the start that neither
the law as a whole, nor the labor law in particular, can by itself provide
what working people or other citizens need to realize and benefit from
following position was put forth:
If the Court had adopted [the dissent]... [a union] would cease to be a voluntary
organization, existing to serve the needs of each of its members, and would become a
purely majoritarian corporation, able to conscript dissident members to serve the goals
of other members, no matter how wrong or foolish the minority felt those goals to
be.... It is not .. hard to imagine other freedoms that might be sacrificed to the
effectiveness of collective action if a freedom so fundamental as that to belong or not to
belong to an association could have been abridged.
Id.; see also Note, Voluntary Unionism Versus Solidarity-Restricting a Union Member's
Right to Resign, 40 Sw. L.J. 893, 907 (1986) (noting that practical effect of decision will benefit
both workers and economy because "[w]ithout the ability to discipline resigning members,
unions will be forced to act quickly, bargain in good faith, and avoid long strikes"); Comment,
The Prohibition of Union Restrictions on Member's Resignations Under the National Labor
Relations Act's Policy of Voluntary Unionism, 31 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 419, 437
(1987) (decision "promotes the Act's original intent to provide a vehicle through which individual employees can shape their own employment relations").
14 For the classical modem analyses of this philosophy, see C. Macpherson, The Political
Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962); J. Plamenatz, Man and Society (1963). For a powerful and effective restatement of the atomist conception, see Taylor, Atomism, in 2 Philosophy and the Human Sciences 187 (1985). On the conception of negative rights grounded in the
fear of others, see Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1392-94 (1984). Much
of classical Marxism was dedicated to revealing the illusory and increasingly oppressive quality
of this ideology. See S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (1968); S.
Avineri, Varieties of Marxism (1977); G. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History (1978).
15 See text accompanying notes 189-332 infra.
16 See Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 Rutgers L.J.
269, 339-46 (1985); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(a), 160(a)-(e) (1982) (laying out organization
and mandate of NLRB). See generally F. McCulloch & T.'Bomstein, The National Labor
Relations Board (1974) (discussing history and purpose of NLRB); R. Swift, NLRB and Management Decision Making (1974) (same).
17 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 117 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
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the ideals of democracy. The law is especially ill-suited for the vindication of collective needs where relationships of power and exchange are
inextricably intertwined. Background inequalities in our society decisively constrain the effective expression of interests and severely hamper
democratic processes. Nevertheless, the law may be able to provide a
modest lever for reducing some of those background inequalities.
With both the law's limits and potential in mind, Part I of this Article offers a philosophical and historical-sociological analysis of labor and
labor-capital relations, focusing on the meaning of employment and the
roots of collective action. Part II examines the sources and symptoms of
the recent doctrinal onslaught against labor, as manifested in the articulation of union members' resignation and strikebreaking rights.
First, this Article shows that however our labor laws may be construed in general terms, they must bear some relationship to the social
realities they govern and help to shape. Labor law must somehow recognize and try to reduce the tensions between the abstract conception of
individual freedom the law systematically prefers and the concrete group
dependencies that characterize societies such as our own. I will, therefore, at the outset highlight some of the difficulties our laws encounter in
comprehending the sociological underpinnings of the employment
relationship.
Second, this Article examines the social realities that underlie production and exchange relationships. These relationships are characterized by asymmetries between employers and workers, which in turn
produce different conceptions of collective identity and different requirements for collective action. This analysis underscores the inadequacy of
our currently prevailing assumptions and values in regard to unions, collective action, and the employment relationship itself. The particular nature of the "goods" exchanged in the employment relationship makes a
collective approach to the discrete problems of individuals essential.
Third, this Article analyzes the communal and legal bases for employee collective identity and action. Solidarity has often been an organic product of worker collective experience existing prior to and then
alongside the law. Among the goals of that solidarity has been to restrict
the logic of the market, a goal that has for the most part, but not entirely,
gone unrealized. The establishment of a democratic and semi-collectivist
system in the NLRA was one such partial success. The NLRA recognizes the conflicts between market and class without resolving them. Instead, it seeks to mitigate those tensions by establishing an "industrial
legal order," 1 8 a peculiar and unstable amalgam of politics and adminis18The phrase was coined in Italy by Antonio Gramsci at the time Italian trade unions
were routinized. See C. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State 137-73 (1980); J. Femia,
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tration committed to providing both rights and regulation. If nothing
else, Congress intended to redress substantive asymmetries between employers and employees by furnishing workers with a collective good,
namely bargaining equality. 19 And that collective and democratic good
is only possible, in an economy like our own, when solidarity is accorded
adequate deference. Put differently, within the collective action frame-

work of the NLRA, efficiency and justice rest on the assumption that
unions may speak to employers with one voice and that employers may
speak with the union and with the union exclusively.

Fourth, this Article examines how unions function in the economy
and in the existing industrial-legal order. They act as partners and as

adversaries of employers, through consent and through coercion; they
insist on process, and they provide incentives. In short, they both help to

guarantee the existing social order and press to modify it. All their activities are contingent on the ability to use selective incentives in dealing
with members and with employers. Only by maintaining its membership

and its coherence may a union exercise the logic of collective action embodied in the NLRA. Hence the defects of PatternMakers are not necessarily a problem for the legislature. Whatever one may think as to the
necessity or desirability of revised labor laws (of either a currently feasi-

ble or more radical sort),20 neither convincing criticism of the decision's
Gramsci's Political Thought (1981); M. Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the
United States 70 (1987).
19 Section 1 of the NLRA begins with a recognition of "[t]he inequality of bargaining
power," linking it to both the absence of social peace and economic crises of underconsumption. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see note 30 infra.
20 A number of trade union leaders, including William Wynn, president of the United
Food & Commercial Workers, and Richard Trumka, president of the United Mine Workers,
as well as a considerable number of labor law academics, of both the left and the right, have in
recent years called either for a significant revision of the NLRA or its abandonment altogether.
See, e.g., Oversight Hearings on the Subject "Has Labor Law Failed" Part I: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor and the Manpower and Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-27, 57-71 (1984) [hereinafter Has Labor Law Failed].
I offer here no particular position on the necessity or utility of alternative legislation; my
argument resides within the bounds of currently existing law. It shares with Professor Summers the position that the basic refusal of American employers to come to terms with and
accept good faith collective bargaining is not a consequence of legislation but is, rather, ideological and material. See id. at 33-38 (statement and testimony of Professor Summers); Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 Buffalo L.
Rev. 9, 17, 19-30 (1982) (collective bargaining and alternative representation along with statutory guarantees and European-style representational entities should be provided the vast majority of employees, who are likely to remain non-unionized); see also Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Hary. L. Rev.
1769 (1983) (detailing extent and relentlessness of employer resistance to collective bargaining
as well as NLRB passivity in face of employer coercion).
The debate about "rights" within critical labor jurisprudence is altogether relevant to the
matters raised in this Article, but it falls beyond its immediate scope. See, e.g., Kennedy,
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logic nor its practical reversal hinges on replacement or supplementation
of existing laws. In fact, the judicial reasoning that culminated in Pattern
Makers has its contemporary origins in decisions themselves intended to
21
strengthen the solidarity and bargaining capacities of trade unions.
Part II of this Article turns to the courts, examining recent cases
that have whittled down the meaning of membership and solidarity.

Concepts fundamental to the NLRA, such as "internal affairs," reciprocal "mutual reliance," and "concerted activities" 22 have been considerably restricted-invariably in the name of the autonomy rights of
individual employees. Throughout the Pattern Makers family of cases,
the Court quite remarkably restricted itself to exploring the union/em-

ployer and employee/union connections. Examined here for their employer/employee implications, these decisions not only encourage
employers to induce breach of the employee/union contract, but posi-

tively invite employer violation of the most basic tenets of labor law.
Although one of the early New Deal test cases, NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co.,23 empowered employers to keep their businesses running during a strike by hiring "replacement" workers, there came to be
significant inducements to rehiring strikers after their strike.24 The recent cases analyzed in this essay remove any brakes in Mackay and exacerbate its worst dangers by encouraging those employers who already
have the capacity to hire strikebreakers to raid the union's ranks for
strikebreakers with job experience. Employers are now effectively empowered to make separate deals with each of their employees to get them
Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 503, 505 (1981) (outlining distinction between workers' rights discourse and critical discourse that reveals powerful demobilizing and co-opting quality of a nevertheless incoherent liberal labor law).
21 See Gould, Solidarity Forever-Or Hardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft-Hartley, and
the Right of Union Members to Resign, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 74, 76-82, 114 (1980); text accompanying notes 161-88 infra.
22 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982).
23 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
24 Mackay, of course, represented a massive "deradicalization" of the NLRA, or the Wagner Act, as it was then known. See note 29 infra. There is no obvious reason why an employer
with a collective agreement should be able to operate during a legal strike of the employees
with whom he has contracted. The United States is virtually alone in permitting this. Nevertheless, there came to be significant legal inducements to rehiring strikers after the strike. See
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1967) (in economic strike, within
certain limits, employee must be reinstated upon request when job becomes available); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288-89 (1956) (employees do not lose status as employees by engaging in unfair labor practice strike); Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 106 (7th
Cir. 1969) (employer may be obliged to seek out former economic strikers), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 920 (1970); C. Summers, H. Wellington & A. Hyde, Cases and Materials on Labor Law
938 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter C. Summers] (employer may be liable for full backpay for refusal
to rehire); Boudin, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 Yale L.J. 630 (1966) (arguing
for abandonment of Mackay rule in favor of allowing only temporary replacements during
strikes).
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back to work one by one-in clear violation of the basic collective bargaining premise embodied in the NLRA and confirmed by the keystone
decision of the New Deal, J.!. Case Co. v. NLRB. 25 J.L Case established
that because a hired worker is the beneficiary of the collective agreement,
an individual hiring contract is subordinate to the collective agreement,
none of the benefits of which may be waived. 26 The Court and the Board
have now generated the employer analogue to the illegal "wildcat"
27
strike.
Part II will also explore the current social environment and the
strong political impetus propelling recent Court and Board trends. It
will look at some of the key steps and cases in the development and determined pursuit of the Board's present perspective. That a relatively
small number of key cases (and turnover in NLRB personnel) could turn
a manifestly pro-union decision like NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 28 against itself tells us a great deal about the environment in
which courts interpret the law and about the plasticity of the law itself.
The accelerated assault on solidarity and the facilitation of union resignations emanate from a broader environment of economic stagnation, employer assertiveness, and union decay. That environment has shaped the
past three or four presidential administrations and the initiatives of some
of their NLRB appointees.
Finally, this Article adumbrates an alternative solution to the problem posed by the need to accommodate both individual rights and union
effectiveness within a system of voluntary unionism. There is no denying
the social, economic, and legal developments that have enfeebled collective bargaining and undermined the strength, size, and identity of labor
unions-all to the detriment of American workers. Nevertheless, if the
courts are prepared to recognize the essential elements of organizational
and community life in private-enterprise democracies, then existing laws
25 321 U.S. 332 (1944). J.L Case remains the definitive interpretation of § 9(a) of the Act,
the exclusive majority representation principle. Section 9(a) states in pertinent part that "representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment. .. " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982); see also Medo Photo Supply
Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 685 (1944) (employer may not bargain separately with individual employees prior to their withdrawal from union).
26 J.L Case, 321 U.S. at 336-38.
27 See Levy, supra note 16, at 344-45 ("[I]f the majority [employee] decision were not to
strike but to accept the employer's terms, the minority would be bound by that decision as
well. They could not then assert their section 7 rights by conducting a 'wildcat' strike in order
to press their own views of what settlement would be desirable." (footnote omitted) (citing
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1939); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975))).
28 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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and judicial precedents are at hand to provide rulings fairer to working
people than Pattern Makers.
I
LABOR, COLLECTIVE ACTION, EMPOWERMENT,
AND THE LAW

A. Social Reality and Labor Law
L

What Does Labor Law Do?
Evidence abounds for several conflicting evaluations of American
labor law. One view is that the law institutionalizes and constricts the
struggles of workers, helping them accept their own subordinate role in a
capitalist society. Another view is that the law offers workers increased
leverage and hope in their dealings with employers, thereby helping them
achieve greater security and participation than would otherwise be the
case. Alternatively, it may do both of these things while also lessening
the likelihood of particular kinds of underconsumptionist economic crises or "recessions" as they are now popularly known. Analysis of contemporary labor law may not require that one select from among them.
One might begin an analysis from the prosaic premise that the
NLRA, even after its 1947 and 1959 revisions, 29 was and is intended,
among other things, to facilitate some shifting equilibrium in the relations between labor-workers free to organize collectively-and employers owning productive enterprises. 30 It would then follow that the
29 The NLRA was originally known as the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)). The NLRA was substantially
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)) and by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(current version in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
30 Thus, § 1 of the Wagner Act states the following:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the
flow of commerce.... Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commere ... by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate.., obstructions to
the free flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose
of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Obviously this text is susceptible to many readings. The one offered in the text accompanying this note is surely plausible enough to find support in the text of § 1 of the Wagner Act.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1268

NLRB and the judiciary charged with overseeing that legislation would
interpret and implement that law in such a way as to maintain the core of
that equilibrium even as it shifts. Even if accumulated labor legislation,
including the "duty to bargain," is instead seen as exclusively procedural
with no power to alter the balance of material resources, 3 1 the "officials"
dictating the rules of combat might still be expected to work from a
premise of equal procedural application. 32 At least in the area of union
solidarity rights, this has not been the case in recent years.33
More modestly still, and less legalistically, one might adopt that historical perspective which sees the Wagner Act as close to the maximum
See, e.g., Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of the American Labor Laws, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 1394 (1971); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401 (1958).
This view is also presented by a considerable number of American labor historians, perhaps a majority. See, e.g., S. Aronowitz, False Promises (1973); D. Brody, Workers in Industrial America 138-46 (1980); J. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics 47-55 (1977); E.
Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly 195-99 (1966); N. Lichtenstein, Labor's
War at Home 33 (1982); N. Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century (1973); B.
Mitchell, Depression Decade 277-80 (1947); D. Montgomery, Workers' Control in America
153-80 (1979); S. Terkel, Working (1972).
31 See Bok, supra note 30, at 1396, 1409-14, 1430-36 (highlighting freedom of contract
proceduralism and its impact on substantive labor law). This "regime of freedom of contract"
has slowly enabled employers, helped by the Board's self-decreed impotence, to empty the
"duty to bargain" of virtually any meaning and use it to turn successful organizational efforts
into hollow victories. See Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospects for Union Representation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 357-63 (1984) (detailing extent of
employer success and Board passivity in these matters); see also note 34 infra. Contra Comment, The Radical Potential of the Wagner Act: The Duty to Bargain Collectively, 129 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1392 (1981) (presenting minimalist reading of potential significance of "duty to
bargain").
32 This point was emphasized in the legislative history of the Act:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes... is to escort them to the door of their employer and
say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens behind
those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
79 Cong. Rec. 7660 (1935) (statement of Sen. Walsh); see also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (NLRA requires "private bargaining under government supervision of the
procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms" but subject to § 8(d),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), requirement that parties bargain and "confer in good faith with
regard to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960) (parties have wide latitude in negotiations; government cannot regulate substantive terms of collective bargaining contracts, but both parties
have duty to bargain in good faith); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342, 349 (1958) (duty to bargain limited to certain mandatory topics only); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134, 139 (1st Cir.) (describing difficulty of assessing evidence of
good or bad faith in bargaining), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); note 69 and accompanying
text infra. All this is an aspect of what has been termed the illusory theory of "joint sovereignty" originating in the compulsory duty to bargain in good faith. Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L.J. 1509, 1545 (1981).
33 See Levy, supra note 16, at 339-41; Comment, Pattern Makers v. NLRB: The Supreme
Court Removes the Resignation Restriction as a Method to Achieve Union Solidarity, 22 Willamette L. Rev. 503, 515-17 (1986).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 1988]

UNION RESIGNATIONS

victory possible for organized labor and its supporters and, therefore, as
close also to the maximum concession tolerable to labor's opponents.
Subsequent history becomes a tale of steady if not unilinear erosion of the
gains achieved by organized labor, one in which "'collective' comes to
mean 'disciplinary' rather than 'communitarian'; 'public' comes to mean

'subject to government regulation,' not 'a forum for communicative in-

teraction'; and 'fundamental' sometimes means a 'precious guarantee of
institutional democracy,' but at other times means 'antiunion.' -34
Finally, one may assume the position adopted here, which takes law
at its own indeterminate word. Labor law provides a terrain of social
struggle and regulation whose real "biography" is political and social
history. Hence, unions rely on what the law has to offer them, but they
also work to create the law and affect its interpretation. 35 Regulation, as
such, has minimal sociopolitical content. If there is evisceration at one
point, there may just as easily be extension and triumph later on. 36 The

synoptic view of arbitration in particular, and labor legislation in general,
provided by Justice Douglas in 1960 can cut various ways: "promote
industrial stabilization," "achieve industrial peace," and "maintain uninterrupted production." '37 The labor laws may be accepted as something

"like a civil rights act" or something "like regulation for securities ex34 Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining

Law, 4 Indus. Re]. L.J. 450, 469 (1981) [hereinafter Klare, Ideology] (footnote omitted); see
also Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal
Consciousness 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978) [hereinafter Klare, Judicial Deradicalization] (emphasizing that Act has been deradicalized in its implementation, that Act ultimately channels and represses rather than mobilizes labor, and that this trajectory is both
historical and logical).
35 The most complete, persuasive, and well-documented elaboration of these dynamics and
how they have worked over the past forty years is presented in J.Rogers, Divide and Conquer:
The Legal Foundations of Post-War U.S. Labor Policy, chs. 2-5 (1984) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Politics, Princeton University) (available from Princeton University Libraries
and Xerox Microfilms, Ann Arbor).
36 As regards the particular issues and conjuncture addressed in this Article, scholars have
not been free of confusion as between the chicken and the egg. Thus, Professor Gould maintains that the "law did not bring on union decline; rather, the law followed on the heels of a
decline already caused by unprecedented levels of unemployment." Gould, Some Reflections
on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor
Law Reform, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 941-42 (1986). This position is more or less tenable depending on the time frame adopted, but it is surely not proven by Gould's data: from 1935 to
1953, 70% of Supreme Court decisions in labor cases involving the NLRB were "pro-union";
from 1953 to 1969 (Warren Court), 80% were "pro-union"; from 1969 to 1986 (Burger
Court), 58% were "pro-union." Id. at 941 nn.18-19. The Court, at least, was responding to
more than labor market softness. If there has been a "retreat," the Court has probably hastened it, just as unions have needed increasingly to look for help.
37 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582 (1960).
These phrases have become the formulaic embodiment of labor law principles in the United
States. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 32, at 1509-20.
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change"; how they are understood will be contested on many fronts. 38
2. Abstract Freedom and Concrete Dependency
All of these perspectives take as their premise the governance of labor relations by law, specifically by the law produced in our own individualist, capitalist-democratic societies. One leading commentator, in a
different context, effectively captured the essence of our regnant rule of
law:
It creates formal equality-a not inconsiderable virtue-but it promotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically
separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from outcomes. By promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own
advantage. And it ratifies and legitimates an... atomistic conception
39
of human relations.
Otto Kahn-Freund, a labor law theorist for over half a century, put the
matter similarly:
The technique of bourgeois [liberal] society and ...law is to cover
social facts and factors of existence with abstractions: property, contract, legal person. All these abstractions contain within them socially
opposed and contradictory phenomena: property used for production
and property used for consumption, agreements between equal parties
and agreements between unequal parties, capitalist and worker.
Through abstraction it is possible to... conceal[ ]the exercise of social
power behind a veil of law.4°
Given law that functions in this manner, it would be unreasonable to
expect too much, or more than certain kinds of things.
The force of the liberal model has been terribly hard to overcome.
Even those explicitly socialist labor lawyers who went furthest in theorizing the decommodification of labor, could not successfully envision a
nontotalitarian rule of law that would escape inherited liberal premises. 41
38 Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 Va. L. Rev. 685,
688 (1985) (insisting that NLRA is more akin to a civil rights act than to a regulatory statute).
Kare has put the point in a manner that stresses, incorrectly I think, the logical over the
historical: "there simply is no consensus on what the social purposes and goals of the collective bargaining system are." Klare, Ideology, supra note 34, at 477-78. It would be more to
the point, I think, to maintain that the consensus is unstable, changing over time and that
while some elements of it are widely shared, others are objects of struggle.
39 Horwitz, The Rule of Law (Book Review), 86 Yale L.J. 561, 566 (1977).
40 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic 102 (R. Lewis & J.
Clark eds. 1981) (1976 essay looking back at and honoring work of Hugo Sinzheimer).
41 The powerful intellectual contribution of these interwar German labor lawyers to legal
and political theory is not yet adequately appreciated in the English-reading world. See, e.g., J.
Blau, Sozialdemokratische Staatslehre in der Weimarer Republik: Hermann Heller, Ernst
Fraenkel, und Otto Kirchheimer (1980); 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics, supra
note 40; 0. Kahn-Freund, Labor Relations: Heritage and Adjustment (1979); 0. Kirchheimer
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Their efforts to transform the employee from a thing to a person, from
the object of contract law to the subject of social labor law, met notable
but sharply limited success. 4 2
In the labor area, this abstract and atomistic conception of our society has been articulated forthrightly in many of the labor law opinions of
Justice Douglas,4 3 including those leading up to the PatternMakers decision. In them, one sees the unmitigatedly atomistic conception of action.
Collective action is essential, according to these opinions, but it should
only be instrumental. Collective action is undertaken by individuals
whose connection to each other is presumed to be limited to the workplace, unrelated to the concrete conditions under which they live. Douglas's great fear is collective overreaching. In his well-known Emporium
dissent, for example, Justice Douglas expressed his concern that "[tihe
Court's opinion makes these Union members... prisoners of the Union.
The law, I think, was designed to prevent that tragic consequence." 44
And in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board,4 5 Douglas, delivering the
opinion of the Court, stressed the individual and an atomistic
individualism:
We have, therefore, only to apply the law[] ... the right of the individual to join or resign from associations, as he sees fit ....[T]he power
of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the unionmember contract.... [W]hen there is a lawful dissolution of a unionmember relation, the union has no more control over the former member than it has over the man in the street.
The Court of Appeals gave weight to the fact that the resigning
employees had participated in the vote to strike. We give that factor
little weight.... [Section] 7 rights [to refrain] are not lost by a union's
plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to
& F. Neumann, Social Democracy and the Rule of Law (K. Tribe ed. 1987); K. Renner, The
Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions (1976).
42 The work of these and other labor theorists culminated in a project for "economic democracy," one that did not succeed but which persists in the thinking of the European labor
left. Its goal was, and is, to transform the sphere of civil society as the political sphere had
been transformed by liberal democracy, from a sphere of subjects to one of citizens. For the
most forceful statement of this goal, see A. Rosenberg, Democracy and Socialism (1965). For
a sympathetic, but largely pessimistic treatment of "economic democracy," see Abraham, Labor's Way: On the Successes and Limits of Socialist Politics in Interwar and Post-World War
II Germany, 28 Int'l Lab. & Working Class Hist. 1, 7-21 (1985).
43 Douglas sat on the Supreme Court bench from 1939 to 1975, thereby taking part in
virtually the entire life cycle of contemporary American labor law; he is an especially qualified
witness.
44 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 73 (1975);
see note 27 supra.
45 409 U.S. 213 (1972). Granite State was a linear predecessor to Pattern Makers' League
v.NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
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46
its regime.

the law
Douglas expressed the instrumentalism and individualism of 47
most clearly in InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street:
Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial society
Once an association with others is compelled by the facts of life,
special safeguards are necessary lest... we all succumb to regimentation .... If an association is compelled, the individual should not be
forced to surrenderany matters of conscience, belief or expression.
The collection of dues for paying the costs of collective bargaining
of which each member is a beneficiary is one thing. [But] the group
money causes
[should not] compel[ ] an individual to support with4his
8
beyond what gave rise to the need for group action.
Nowhere in these opinions is there a perceived connection between
individual freedom and community. Instead, they evince an abiding concern for the rights of individual union members against both their unions
and their employers. The labor law-which was born out of group conflict over the constraints of real industrial life-has thus become the
monitor of abstract individual rights while obscuring the relationships of
power and dependency that exist between workers and employers.
It is not difficult to understand this preference for individual and
largely negative rights. 4 9 Justice Douglas's "don't tread on me" philosophy is entirely consistent with the liberal individualism of our democracy
and the quasi-individualism of our capitalist market society. We prize
our autonomy and guard it zealously, even as we associate with others to
further our needs. Yet in the background, we fear that others will overwhelm our preferences and compel us to adopt theirs. Thus, we need
others to help us flourish, but insist on negative rights to protect us from
them. Different social arrangements will generate different balance
points for this tension. Professor Tushnet has depicted our own prevailing tension and balance point extremely well:
In our culture, the fear of being crushed by others so dominates the
desire for sociality that our body of rights consists largely of negative
ones.... The contemporary rhetoric of rights speaks primarily to
negative [rights]. By abstracting from real experiences and reifying the
idea of rights, it creates a sphere of autonomy stripped of any social
46

409 U.S. at 216-18 (citations omitted), rev'g 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).

47 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
48
49

Id. at 775-77 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 14, at 1392-93.
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context and counterposes to it a sphere of social life stripped of any

content.50
B.
1.

Collective Identity and Collective Action

People and Things: Production and Exchange

At times, it may be difficult to recall that labor law and organization
are about people. The activities of working people today seem to elicit

neither theoretical novelty nor human sympathy.5 1 Federal labor law
and a half-century of its administration have rendered both initial union
organizational efforts and subsequent strike-related activities relatively
unglamorous;5 2 these labor law struggles have become routine. The current and protracted weakness of American trade unions, their failure to
keep abreast of political and economic transformations, their apparent

inability to protect their domains, and widespread public disenchantment
with their roles have all contributed to a weakening of the public's appre-

ciation of collective action.- 3 Yet, as social beings, problems of collective
action confront us all every day.
54
The legal image of free and isolated individuals presented thus far
is ultimately drawn from and reinforces the market image of atomized
persons-fearful of each other, but willing to enter limited contracts of
mutual advantage.5 - To the extent that this image reflects the non-asso5o Id.
51 The once widely shared heroic image of labor organizing exists today primarily as cultural memory. See, e.g., Matewan (Cinecom Entertainment Group & Film Gallery 1987);
Norma Rae (Twentieth Century-Fox 1979). Even there, attention is drawn to community
rather than to legal struggles. One is hard pressed to cite a labor law equivalent to the many
books chronicling civil and community rights battles. See, e.g., R. Kluger, Simple Justice
(1976) (fight against racial discrimination); A. Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (1964) (struggle to
establish right to counsel for indigents); G. Stem, Buffalo Creek Disaster (1976) (heroic portrayal of mine disaster damage suits).
52 This is all the more evident when compared with other, less institutionalized arenas of
social conflict, such as civil rights, feminism, and the environment. Recent instances of widespread public concern over labor issues have tended to center around community mobilization
rather than legal activity. See, e.g., Risen, Hormel Strike May Divide Town for Years to
Come, L.A. Times, Sept. 1, 1986, at 18 (discussing 1987 Hormel meatpackers' strike in Austin,
Minn.).
53 M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at 45 (presenting and assessing various symptoms, manifestations, and possible causes of trade union decline).
54 See note 14 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 39-50 supra.
55 A similar image drawn from the work of Hobbes marks the starting point of the labor
law writings of Richard Epstein. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1401 (1983) ("Within the
framework of individual rights, it is proper to accept Hobbes's injunction that the determinants of contractual fairness lie in the 'appetites of the contracting parties.' "). One might go
on to argue that since for Epstein all contracts are, by implication, contracts among willing
unequals, there is no logical reason to be upset by "pseudo-problems" like adhesion or unequal
bargaining power. Epstein encounters greater difficulties in attempting the move from Hobbes
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ciational facet of social life, it testifies to domination by commodities and
their masters. We remain within a Robinson Crusoe world, where the
social character of each producer's labor becomes clear only in the act of
exchange. Karl Marx's classic statement of this predicament remains
pertinent:
[T]he mutual relations of the producers, within which the social character of their labour affirms itself, take the form of a social relation
between the products....
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it
the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective
character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented
to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour... There is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a
relation between things.
...

Since the producers do not come into social contact with each

other until they exchange their products, the specific social character
of each producer's labour does not show itself except in the act of
56
exchange.
By obscuring the social character of relations of production, capitalism
contributes mightily to the acceptance of the status quo as natural and
57
immutable.
Lived social experience nevertheless compels individuals to act in
concert with others beyond market exchanges. 58 Those who choose to
act with others, be it in furtherance of a shared goal or identity or only to
advance the likelihood of obtaining their private wishes, must seek more
than exchange. They must assess the situation, organize and inform
themselves, formulate a collective goal, and then act strategically, emto Locke. The latter's ideas of original ownership in common and a labor theory of value are
difficult to reconcile with Epstein's Hobbesian starting point and pose serious obstacles to Epstein's labor law. See R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 11-12 (1985) ("[T]he weaknesses in Locke's account of the acquisition of private property
.. show that Locke did not justify private property as securely as he might have.... [W]e
[can] correct his account.., to remove all traces of original ownership in common.").
56 1 K. Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy-The Process of Capitalist Production 72-73 (S. Moore & R. Aveling trans. 1967).
57 The great cultural accomplishment of the middle class, manifested still in current law,
has been to give a specific historical construct the appearance of naturalness and inevitability.
See, e.g., P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 164 (1977) (a social order produces "the
naturalization of its own arbitrariness"); A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory 195
(1979) (referring to "the naturalization of the present"); R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy 77
(1956) (explaining fatalism of British working class life).
58 One recent philosophical approach, "rational choice," which challenges counter-individualist assumptions, has challenged this as well, sometimes from within marxist philosophy.
See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (1979); J. Elster, Sour Grapes (1983); Elster, Exploitation,
Freedom, and Justice, 26 Nomos 277 (1983).
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ploying selective incentives as well as collective discipline to obtain that
goal. 59
Our culture and law are generally reluctant to validate collective
action. Writing in a different context, Professor Fiss observed that
"equal protection rights are not only individualized, but also universal6
ized" and "no person seems to be given more protection than another."
Despite its "structural limitations" and inadequacies, this conception of

rights as belonging to individuals appeals to courts and resonates with
cultural norms, 6 1 whose origins lie in the dominance of market exchange.
In vain, it seems, did Fiss call for a legal application "that recognizes the
'62
existence and importance of groups, not just individuals."
Subordinated groups, be they the black Americans discussed by Fiss or
the working people discussed here, are disorganized through the largescale legal denial of collective identity, interest, and action. 63 Their existence as distinct entities whose members are interdependent is simply denied. Legal issues are narrowly defined and applied to specific parties.64

59 Such activities must therefore be about constituting collectivities before they can engage
action between collectivities; identity thus precedes interest. See Przeworski, Proletariat into
Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's 'The Class Struggle' to Recent
Controversies, 7 Pol. & Soc'y 343 (1977); notes 147-59 and accompanying text infra (discussing logic of collective action).
60 Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 128 (1976).
61 Id. at 129. The preferences that Fiss records, and which this Article argues originate in
market relations, are mediated by a number of factors. These include a broad commitment to
the "rule of law," especially salient to the courts, see notes 39-42 and accompanying text
supra, the training and professional ethos of the lawyers who argue actual cases, and the role of
the legal process itself in organizing and regulating conflicts among groups with varying power
and resources.
62 Fiss, supra note 60, at 136. Fiss offered a definition of social groups that is readily
transferred to the labor context:
[A] social group is more than a collection of individuals, all of whom, to use a polar
example, happen to arrive at the same street corner at the same moment. A social group
... has two other characteristics. (1) It is an entity ....
This means that the group has
a distinct existence apart from its members, and also that it has an identity ...
(2) There is also a condition of interdependence. The identity and well-being of the
members of the group and the identity and well-being of the group are linked.
Id. at 148.
63 See Grau, Whatever Happened to Politics? A Critique of Structuralist Marxist Accounts of State and Law, in Marxism and Law 196, 205-06 (P. Biere & R. Quinney eds.
1982).
64 The legal impediments described by Fiss have been heightened over the past dozen
years. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (Massachusetts law
giving preference to veterans in employment does not discriminate against women because
statute is gender-neutral and not pretext for gender discrimination); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (to show that decision violates equal protection
clause, plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent was motivating factor); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (to demonstrate that facially neutral law violates equal protection clause,
plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent was motivating factor, and not just that law has
racially disproportionate impact); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (absent interdistrict
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The rights of the employee who deserts the union and breaks a strike
must be balanced against the union's rights, lest collectives make prison65
ers of individuals.
The equivalence imposed on the contract partners by the individualist market paradigm 66 confounds essential aspects of the relations of production. For example, in most Western countries, strikes and lockouts
are viewed as essentially equivalent actions, and hence "equally legitimate measures of the supply and demand sides of the 'labor market.' "67
Indeed, the very term "labor market" suggests the sameness of the market for goods and services and the market for labor, as well as the equality and free choice that the parties on the supply and demand sides
putatively enjoy.
But a worker cannot be separated from his labor power even when
he is forced to sell it. This distinguishes that "commodity" from all
others. The worker legally surrenders control over something that remains physically under his control. He has reason to think that it is still
his even after he sells it. As Professors Offe and Wiesenthal put it, labor
power is not a commodity "because it cannot be physically separated
from its 'owner'; because it does not come into being in expectation of its
salability; because it is of no use-value for its... 'owner'; and because its
owner is therefore forced to enter into a wage contract. ' 68 To treat labor
power and workers as commodities, or as inputs, creates a profound
asymmetry of power and freedom between the people on the supply and
demand sides of the market allocating that commodity.
2.

CapitalistDemocracy: Employers and Workers

As an alternative to accepting this situation-the asymmetrical consequences of treating "labor power as a commodity"-a single worker
can choose only unemployment or self-subsistence; rarely does either offer the possibility of changing the asymmetry of the original bargaining
position. Merely allowing the individuals on either side of the table to
bargain collectively-as prescribed by more minimal readings of the
de jure school segregation no basis for interdistrict remedy). Social discrimination is not
enough. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). This growing emphasis on
an explicit showing of ill intent plus personal harm parallels developments in labor law.
65 See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
66 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.

67 Offe & Wiesenthal, Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class
and Organizational Form, I Pol. Power & Soc. Theory 67, 70 (1980).
68 Id. Equating the unequal--conceiving of individuals as equals-may be a worthy ideal,
but it obscures the reality of social class. This insight is by no means limited to marxists.
Thus, Charles Lindblom has noted the tendency to "treat all interest groups as though on the
same plane, and, in particular, [to] treat labor, business and farm groups as though operating
at some parity with each other." C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets 193 (1977).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 1988]

UNION RESIGNATIONS

NLRA-is likely to leave the asymmetrical relationship in place. For
without affording the labor side the opportunity to define a collective
identity, and to foster identification by the workers with the union, the
bargaining positions remain inherently unequal. As the Supreme Court
has put it, "[o]ur labor policy is not presently erected on a foundation of
government control of the results of negotiations.... Nor does it contain a charter for the [NLRB] to act at large in equalizing disparities of
bargaining power between employer and the union."69
The power to determine substantive terms resides in society, not in
the law. That social relationship will simply be reproduced, because

power, in the end, will secure itself.70 In strike and similar situations,
workers, if they are to have any chance of success, must operate on the
basis of a collective identity which overcomes the individuality of their
resources and interests rather than simply aggregating them. Offe and
Wiesenthal argue that this requires "changing the standards according to
which these costs [of collective action] are subjectively estimated within
their own collectivity. ' 71 That is, unions must be able to change the way

union members perceive the costs of union membership.
In private enterprise economies, the market itself "naturally" accomplishes much of what employers want. The public interest seems to
require that the logic of profit accumulation be privileged in the
macroeconomic circuit: profits -+ investment --> production -+ jobs --+
wages and taxes -+ consumption --+ profits. Worker livelihood and government resources alike appear directly dependent on an adequate profit
level. 72 In a significant sense, therefore, employers-the owners of capital-do not need to do very much. They do not have to identify and
69 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960); see also H.K. Porter
Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106, 108 (1970) (Act is based on "private bargaining under government supervision of the procedure alone, without any compulsion over the actual terms" subject to the requirement of section 8(d) that parties bargain and "'confer in good faith with
regard to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment'" (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1982))). For competing views on the duty to bargain, see notes 30-31 supra.
70 Or, as Offe and Wiesenthal put it:
[S]uperior power also means superior ability to defend and reproduce power. The powerful are fewer in number, are less likely to be divided among themselves, have a clearer
view of what they want to defend, and have larger resources for organized action, all of
which imply that they are likely to succeed in recreating the initial situation.
Offe & Wiesenthal, supra note 67, at 78.
71 Id. (emphasis omitted).
72 This construction of the public interest is a cornerstone of capitalist democracies. For
three essential discussions of the logic and predicaments of capitalist democracy, see J. Cohen
& J. Rogers, On Democracy 47-87 (1983); C. Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State 35-64,
119-29, 179-206 (1984); A. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy 7-46, 133-222
(1985). I have examined a capitalist democracy in crisis, specifying and elaborating on the
analysis outlined here. See D. Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political
Economy and Crisis xv-xxii, 1-7 (2d ed. 1986).
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promote their general interest collectively or individually. Their general
interest is simply there, valorized by, and identified with, society's general needs. For an employer to ascertain his real interests, he or she need
not consult with other employers in order to reach a mutual determination. Erroneous judgments on the part of the employer "are fed back to
him from his market environment in unequivocal quantitative-market
terms and within a relatively short time."'7 3 The employer's interest is
"monological"-there is no gap between an employer's interest as an individual and an employer's interest as a member of her class or of
society.
Employees, however, are in a different position. Their interests are
normally perceived in capitalist democracies as special, partial, even selfish interests. To realize them, employees must rise above the individual
and atomistic efforts that society calls "natural" and instead depend on a
shared and collective perception of their general interest. Their interests
are "dialogical"-absent collective activity, the worker is torn between
her interests as an individual and her interests as a member of her class.
To assert their general interest effectively, employees in a union
must be in a position to: (1) value being a member for its own sake;
(2) accept organizational costs as a necessary sacrifice rather than as a
utility; and (3) be required to practice solidarity and discipline and other
nonutilitarian norms.74 To a certain extent, of course, this is a matter of
worker volition. Workers must choose between economic and more
broadly political goals, between individual and collective means of
achieving those goals. They must choose among their various identities
(worker, consumer, taxpayer, patriot, ethnic, male/female, Christian,
'75 It
etc.), and between individual and collective calculuses of "success.
has long been recognized that "some of the most important bargaining
under unionism goes on inside the union, where the desires of workers
with disparate interests are weighed in a political process that decides the
'76
union's positions at the bargaining table."
If, as with worker solidarity, "the decision to pursue democracy is
not a calculation but a choice,"' 77 it is equally true that the law helps
constrain our possible choices. As with democracy as a whole, so it is
with the efforts of labor in particular. In the name of individual choice,
73 Offe & Weisenthal, supra note 67, at 91.
74 Id. at 79. Offe and Wiesenthal add that the cultural hegemony of the capitalist class
"allows [it] to partly control the symbols and values which play a role in the identities and
aspirations of the members of the subordinate class. Consequently, much greater communicative and organizational efforts are required on the part of the working class if such hegemonic
impact... is to be neutralized." Id. at 92.
75 Id. at 93.

76 Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 Pub. Interest 69, 84 (1979).
77 J. Cohen & J. Rogers, supra note 72, at 180.
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labor law, as interpreted by the courts, 78 inhibits those associational
forms that can refine the accuracy of the interests articulated by workers
while also separating the representation of interests from their activa-

tion. 79 Similarly, individual free choice reduces the possibility of generating an ideology that would provide a shared conception of collective
identity. The difficulty, as one industrial economist has noted, is that
unions are often unable to "provide a justification which is broad enough
to attract and maintain the larger political consensus upon which their
existence is predicated."' 0

Obstacles of the sort discussed here are sometimes overcome. They
are generally overcome precisely by that collective-identity organization
and struggle which the law generally discourages."' The NLRA itself is

one of the clearest examples of a legal structure that is meant, at least
partially, to encourage collective-identity.8 2 Indeed, in this respect it differs from the individualizing and atomistic impulse of the law generally.
The NLRA has both created a weakly corporatist industrial legal order

and provided workers with the opportunity to construct their identifies
along with their demands.8 3 Both developments have gone through two
See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
Such "corporatization," or transformation of a union from an associational form into an
agency of interest mediation, is disempowering. See Jessop, Corporatism, Parliamentarism
and Social Democracy, in Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation 185-212 (P. Schmitter &
G. Lehmnbruch eds. 1979) (key text on transformation of industrial relations in Western Europe from associational and conflictive to juridical and corporatist); Lehrnbruch, Liberal Corporatism and Party Government, in Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation 147-83 (P.
Schmitter & G. Lehmbruch eds. 1979) (same); Panitch, The Development of Corporatism in
Liberal Democratic Societies, 10 Comp. Pol. Stud. 61 (1977) (examining how rank and file
demobilization is part of three-way corporatist labor relations that reduces conflict).
80 Offe & Wiesenthal, supra note 67, at 112 n.6 (citing M. Piore, Unions and Politics 6
(1978)). Professor Piore also perceives union behavior as "predicated upon a notion of group
action which contradicts and appears to violate the central tenets of individualism. The basic
task of a philosophy of labor is to overcome these contradictions and create 'space within the
individualistic self-conception of Americans for such a group." ht Piore, Unions and Politics
6 (1978).
81 See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
82 The effort to conceptualize group identities, group rights, and collective-identity formation in a liberal society, and then to locate them between the marketplace and the polity, is a
very difficult one. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra. For some of the contemporary difficulties involved in empowering collectivities residing in the spaces between the individual citizen and the state, see Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights for the Enployment
Relation, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1980) (noting difficulty in cognizing collective liberty of
group members to make laws for themselves); Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L
Rev. 1057, 1123-25 (1980) (expressing discomfort with collective-identity formation and empowerment in residential loci).
83 The key indicator of this broader mandate for the fostering of worker collective identity
is contained in § 7 of the Act, which protects "the [employee's] right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively... and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
.... 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Comment, A Union's Right to Con78
79
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phases historically and continue to show two facets organizationally.
The first of these historic phases might be labelled the community, cultural, or organic phase of working-class trade union activity; the second
can be called the juridical, bureaucratic, or business phase. The features
of these historical phases exist today as aspects of working class organization. Both have aimed to aggregate individual worker interests and
magnify their force. Both have involved the union simultaneously as a
bureaucratic institution and as a cultural nexus facilitating the mobilization and engagement of workers.
C. Making Cement from Sand

1. Community and Culture
Marxist working-class socialism may never have been as popular in
the United States as it was in Europe,8 4 but the liberal ideology to which
it opposed itself was surely as normative in the United States as in Europe, indeed more so. 85 Nevertheless, the imposition of "labor market"
logic onto the lives of working people has never been completed. Too
many other features of life have provided bases for resisting it, despite a
86
steady process of commodification.
Workers historically entered into "manifold relations with one another," supplementing those engendered at the workplace. 87 They were
part of structured, organized communities that provided them a "thick
enough network of mutual interactions"8 8 to enable them to resist and
trol Strike-Period Resignations, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 339, 348-64 (1985) (examining legislative
intent and statutory language).
84 See, e.g., S. Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement 154-219 (1928); N. Salvatore,
Eugene Debs: Citizen and Socialist 186-87, 190-94 (1982). Contra Wilentz, Against Exceptionalism, 26 Int'l Lab. & Working Class Hist. 1 (1984) (arguing for breadth and depth of anticapitalist sentiment among American workers, linking republicanism and socialism). For a
summary of recent discussions of the utility for progressive politics and law of the indigenous
"republican" ideology, see generally Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J.
(1988).
85 In the absence of any strong feudalistic or group-rights past, the United States, with the
notable exception of the former slave-owning South, proved fertile soil for the spread of a
liberal ideology of industrial and labor relations. See L. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in
America (1955) (classic statement of hegemony of liberal ideology in America); M. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977) (mixture of laissez faire and interventionist conceptions in commercial law fostered both capitalist economic development
and class society); B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 111-55, 413-32
(1966) (Civil War marked victory of liberal capitalism and, outside South, of individualist
ideology).
86 Intellectuals have often been prepared to declare the surrender of working people to the
logic of commodities and markets; for a classic case, see M. Horkheimer & T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment 120-67 (1944) (culture industry eliminates residue of impulses to emancipation formerly present in popular culture).
87 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 123 (1963).
88 R. Hardin, Collective Action 228 (1982).
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fight against a market conception of labor. Individual workers facing the
blandishments or compulsions of the market (or police) would again and
again find themselves "having to make a choice in the presence of others
[which] tends to lead people to act morally, especially when the choice is
carefully defined as a conflict between personal and group interests." 89
Therefore, it was not strictly a matter of historical reflection when
Karl Polanyi, writing in 1944, a time of considerable union vitality, underscored the unnaturalness of labor markets and the possibility of permanent resistance:
To separate labor from other activities of life and to subject it to the
laws of the market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence and
to replace them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and
individualistic one. Such a scheme of destruction was best served by
the application of the principle of freedom of contract. In practice this
meant that the noncontractual organizations of kinship, neighborhood,
profession and creed were to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual.... To represent this principle as one of noninterference.., was merely the expression... in favor of a definite
kind of interference, namely, such as would destroy noncontractual relations between individuals and prevent their spontaneous reformation. 90
It is unlikely that the abstract logic of labor exploitation is capable
of producing a full account of peoples' struggles. A set of economic categories alone, however oppressive, cannot provide the solidarity that
makes people act together. Workplace solidarity, for example, was just
as strongly formed around the social sinews of working-class communities. Individual lives were, and are, embedded in "manifold relations;"
these relations, in turn, once nurtured, maintained, and to some degree
imposed, community values in the face of opposing individual interests.
That, however, was before the relative demise of ethnicity, workingclass neighborhoods and entertainments, intergenerational proximity,
churches, and public spaces, and before the rise of suburbs, lone travel by
auto, homogenized cultural forms, high geographical mobility rates, and
privatized home entertainment. 9 1 Thus, the kind of willing coercion so
89 Id.

at 114.

90 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation 163 (1957). This powerful quotation has also
received the attention of Professor Sunstein. See Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1041, 1049 (1984); note 71 supra; notes 113-25 and
accompanying text infra.
91 In recent years, the empirical study of these and other factors has been something of an
historical growth industry. See, e.g., J.Bodnar, The Transplanted (1985) (describing absorption of immigrants into working-class communities); V. Green, A Mining Community on
Strike (1968) (examining exercise of solidarity in Slovak mining community in West Virginia);
J. Green, The World of the Worker (1981) (detailing decline in community and labor after
1947); H. Gutman, Power and Culture (1987) (documenting role of religious, ethnic, and other
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difficult for the courts now to accept was, at one time, commonplace and
embraced as a source of solidarity.
Such "manifold relations" fostered organizational strength and rendered legal coercion less important. Community may have been especially important in the United States, where the relative absence of
explicitly ideological politics made it more difficult to integrate diverse
subgroups by offering them a coherent road map of society.92 Jack
London's classic definition of a scab, for example, is less about economics, politics, or class forces than it is about solidarity:
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad and the vampire, He
had some awful substance left with which He made a scab .... Where
others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles.
...The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children
and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer.
Esau was a traitor to himself, Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country; 93
a SCAB is a traitor to his
God, his country, his family and his class.
Community solidarity, sometimes including local members of other
social classes, furnished workers a kind of group contract or convention.
This enabled them both to put their collective "public goods" ahead of
ties in building solidarity); W. Komblum, Blue Collar Community (1974) (arguing that unions
reenforced sense of community where such already existed); J. Leggett, Class, Race, and Labor
(1968) (examining community and class in Detroit); L. Rubin, Worlds of Pain (1976) (discussing role of family and cross-generational proximity); C. Stack, All Our Kin (1974) (looking at
a black working-class community); Southern Workers and Their Unions, 1880-1975 (1981)
(arguing local solidarity important but hostility of power centers generally required combined
local-national efforts).
Compare these studies with the labor process focus of H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974) (stressing worker power resident in command of job process with subsequent removal of "managers' brains" from "under workman's cap"); M. Burawoy,
Manufacturing Consent (1979) [hereinafter M. Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent] (labor process itself generates both solidarity and consent, protest, and stability); M. Burawoy, The Politics of Production (1985) [hereinafter M. Burawoy, The Politics of Production] (production
regimes in broad sense determine subjects of conflict no matter what status of communities);
R. Edwards, Contested Terrain (1979) (paternalist, technocratic, and bureaucratic forms of
labor and workplace management variously condition terms of employee solidarity and activism); D. Gordon, R. Edwards & M. Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers (1982) (structured segmentation of workforces and industrial sectors increasingly undermines possibilities
for solidarity); D. Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (1987) (centralization of state
power, segmentation of labor markets, and cultural weakening drove labor from solidarity to
corporatism).
92 See Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in Ideology and Discontent 47, 65-73 (D.
Apter ed. 1964) (ideology provides adherents a road map, helping them locate particular issues
as well as right and wrong generally).
93 London, The Scab (1905), reprinted in C. Summers, supra note 24, at 1035. Distinct
elements of this kind of solidarity appear in the communities portrayed favorably in Gerald
Stem's book about the Buffalo Creek mining disaster, see G. Stem, supra note 51, and with
hostility in S. Petro, The Kingsport Strike (1967) (portraying community solidarity in Kingsport printers strike).
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their immediate individual benefit and to avoid the temptation of "free
riding." Through community, ideology, willing coercion, and other "extrarational" motivations, unions demonstrated that "larger groups are"
not necessarily "more likely to fail than smaller ones."' 94 Hardin locates
a key basis for the success of classical labor activity: "the desire to live
one's own history by participating" 95-to which one might add the
shared and felt necessity to change that history.
2.

The IndustrialLegal Order and Legislative Intent

Community has declined, but the labor laws, the employees, and the
employers are still here. The "concessions" made to labor half a century
ago cannot simply be considered artifacts of a bygone era, for community
no longer provides workers with the same measure of political muscle
they once enjoyed. It would be difficult to deny that, as a general tendency, the segmentation of the labor.force along lines of industrial sector,
skill, race and ethnicity, gender, and age has become more acute in recent
decades. This is true both as an objective matter at the workplace and
subjectively, as the degree of community, value coherence, and organization has declined within the American (and some other) working
classes. 9 6 What remains is an industrial legal order. The forces that produced it may no longer be present, but, however desiccated, it continues
to govern labor relations.
"The legal substance of labor law," as Sinzheimer pointed out, "lies
in the recognition of classes by the law."' 97 Once those classes are recognized, the law establishes certain norms, which "attempt to temper the
employer's power to command." '98 And where the employment contract
seeks to combine exchange (property) with subordination (power), the
law furnishes organizational opportunities for employees, as well as stipulating formal obligations and suggesting general norms for both parties.
In this sense, as Brousseau has emphasized, "the law of labor relations is
designedly and necessarily anti-individualistic. The collective interest is
made paramount." 99 Workers are expected to pool their energies as employers do their money.
Labor law is thus meant to be partisan and to favor labor, at least in
R. Hardin, supra note 88, at 107.
Id. at 4.
96 See D. Gordon, R. Edwards & M. Reich, supra note 91 (quoting Sinzheimer).
97 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics, supra note 40, at 81.
98 Id. at 79; see also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (because the "inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized... tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions...
collective bargaining" should be "encourag[ed]"); note 30 supra.
99 Brousseau, supra note 82, at 12.
94

95
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this procedural sense. lo0 Because at the substantive level it tolerates, indeed ratifies, private ownership and labor market insecurity, offering no
substantive right to gainful employment, for example, the proceduraltilt
is toward labor. 10 1 For example, the key assumption behind the exclusive majority representation principle' 02 of section 9(a)10 3 is that
assertion of individual right for momentary individual gain will inevitably lead to the weakening and ultimate destruction of the collective
and thus to a recurrence of the naked weakness of the individual employee.... As against management there is but one voice; as to labor,
management has but one ear to lend.... Congress has in open and
purposive aid of the individual worker established the collective
principle. 104

Rather than the dual subjugation the Pattern Makers Court seemed
to fear-both the union's restriction on the employee's right to resign
and the restriction on the employee's right to work while the union is on
strike' 0 5-the NLRA was meant to provide employees a more significant
liberty, backed by statutory support and the power of collective identity
and organization. The Court in Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition
Community Organization,10 6 recalled both the collective nature of the
Act and its purpose "within a regime of majority rule" where "[Section 7
rights to participate or refrain from concerted activity] are, for the most
part, collective rights, rights to act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are protected not for their own sake but as an instrument of the
107
national labor policy ....
In the eyes of the NLRA's drafters, there was no conflict between
democracy and collectivism. Indeed, for employees-the weaker partycollectivism was a prerequisite for democracy in the industrial sphere.
Senator Wagner himself maintained that "democracy in industry must be
based on the same principles as democracy in government. Majority
rule, with all its imperfections, is the best guaranty of workers' rights,
just as it is the surest guaranty of political liberty that mankind has yet
100 Cf. id. at 12, 17 (admitting importance of collectivization, but arguing for nonpartisan
administration).
101 Cf. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 630-32 (1983)
(discussing liberal tendency to eschew difficult substantive issues through proceduralization).
102 See note 25 supra.
103 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
104 Brousseau, supra note 82, at 23-24 (footnotes omitted).
105 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 112-16 (1985); accord Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 73 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (characterizing members as "prisoners of the union").
106 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
107 Id. at 62; see also note 30 supra (§ 1 of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), recognizes
prevalence of "employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association").
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discovered." 10 8 Wagner was willing to uncouple ownership and participation. Commenting on the underlying rationale of the NLRA, Wagner
said:
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were
founded upon the accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry as well as in government; that democracy in industry means fair
participation by those who work in the decisions vitally affecting their
lives and livelihood; and that the workers in our great mass production
industries can enjoy this participation only if allowed to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. 109

The encouragement of union growth and stability was one obvious
avenue for advancing democracy. This was recognized in the 1935 legislation and has remained in subsequent revisions. Hence, while section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA makes it unlawful for a union to "restrain or
coerce... employees in the exercise of [their section 7] fights," a proviso
to that paragraph stipulates that the statute "shall not impair the right of
a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....

."110 Further, the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin
Act)"' proclaimed that it would not "impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of
1112 Even
every member toward the organization as an institution ...
the most severe critics of the NLRA acknowledge that it links collectivism and democracy and "puts great weight on the processes of participation and bargaining."' 1 3 Likewise, its "crucial step in empowerment [of
103 79 Cong. Rec. 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). Wagner's statement is very
explicit so far as it goes, but it does not reach the asymmetries between the polity and the
economy. That all citizens "own" the state is self-evident, but it is just as evident that private
industries are not owned by everyone. They are not even public utilities, and the "proprietary"
stake of employees in the plant is deemed less than scant. Efforts to take it over, even in the
context of concerted action directed toward mandatory subjects of bargaining, would not be
countenanced. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sitdown strikers may be discharged; imputation of theft); note 72 supra (discussing relationship between
capitalism and democracy).
109 N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20. Professor Summers, though wary of collectivism,
cites this passage as part of the considerable evidence for the far-reaching, but unfulfilled,
democratic promises and goals of the NLRA. Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's
Unfulfilled Promise, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 29, 34 (1979). The Act itself should be viewed in
conjunction with the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-441, 1001-1461 (1982), the WageHour Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216, 217-219 (1982), and certain other statutes because they were
all New Deal legislative responses to the Depression. See generally M. Derber, The American
Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865-1965 (1970) (history of labor reform in United States).
110 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982).
Ill 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
112 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982).
113 Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1012,
1020 (1984) (advocating loosening of unions' claims over memberships in favor of free choice
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workers] comes in the duty to bargain and in the exclusivity principle." 114 This industrial legal order contemplated by the Act arguably
attained its clearest form in J.L Case Co. v. NLRB. 115 Strongly put,
"[t]he J.I. Case vision is a vision of collective empowerment, or of the
creation of a right in a collectivity, in which individuals participate only
116
as they participate in that collectivity, and on its terms."
No doubt, labor law is essentially a product of that period in recent
history, from the Bolshevik Revolution through the Depression, when
governments dabbled in corporatist responses to social and economic crises and workers and unions threatened the overall stability of society.1 17
Even the law, in its efforts to institutionalize conflict, was forced to recognize classes. The law placed considerable faith in enlightened (and
democratic) state administration, primarily through the agency of the
Board,1 18 coupling that faith with the vision of industrial democracy articulated by Wagner and others. 119 At its core, it accepted collectivism,
paternalism, and community while rejecting both the free labor market
and socialism. 120 Whether ultimately successful or not, the NLRA system sought to mirror or appropriate the reality of working class collectivity and community life by "fostering a sense of solidarity among workers
and promoting participation in decisionmaking processes at the
12 1
workplace."
It merits restating that democratic and collectivist processes were to
proceed hand in hand, even as the channels for their advance were
corporatized. Certainly the NLRA was, and is, "merely" procedural; 122
substantive terms, like wages and hours, for example, were addressed in
and statutory minimum terms).
114 Id. at 1024. Fried sees these two principles as "coupled" and together amounting to "a
partial transfer to the union of what was once an unrestricted authority" vested in the employer-owner. See id. at 1026 (footnote omitted).
115 321 U.S. 332, 336-39 (individual hiring terms are subordinated to collective agreement);
see notes 25, 102 and accompanying text supra.
116 Fried, supra note 113, at 1028.
117 See notes 29-37 and accompanying text supra. The same was true in Europe during the
same period. See generally C. Maer, Recasting Bourgeois Europe (1979) (discussing centrality of labor conflict in evolution from bourgeois to corporatist Europe).
118 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-160 (1982); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667, 676 (1961) (Board's discretion limited by its obligation to adhere to congressional
policies); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (Board's discretion in
administering NLRA derives from presumed expertise and statutory mandate); Levy, supra
note 16, at 272-79 (discussing historic role of NLRB prior to Reagan years).
119 See notes 108-09 and accompanying text supra.
120 Professor Sunstein alludes to several of the possible theoretical underpinnings for a labor
law system and refers to market-failure, redistributional, and paternalist perspectives. Sunstein, supra note 90, at 1042-47.
121 Id. at 1057-58. Sunstein accords this position wide adherence. Id.
122 Cf. Unger, supra note 101, at 630-33 (liberal solutions deficient because overwhelmingly
procedural).
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other legislation, which also generally created individual rather than collective rights or entitlements. 123 But the key goal of the NLRA system,
achieved only in the most minimal sense, of providing workers a tangible
role in the operation of the workplace without expropriating the core of
ownership, was, and remains, feasible solely in collective terms. The circle of capitalist ownership cannot be squared by labor legislation.1 24 If,
however, this key goal is to be honored by our courts, they must acqui-

esce in the disciplinary aspects of collective identity formation and action
contemplated by the Act. 125
D. Unions in the "IndustrialLegal Order"
L

What Do Unions Do in the System?

In recent years, rationales have been developed for justifying a loosening of the selective incentives unions may apply to their members.
Some commentators have alleged that unions are suboptimal for the national economy as a whole. According to these commentators, unions,
among other things, reduce productivity, discourage innovation, drive
capital and jobs abroad, and even enrich some workers at the expense of
123 See, e.g., Workman's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8173 (1982) (establishing
workmen's compensation program); Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, 5
U.S.C. §§ 8501-8522, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3309, 6157, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49b, 49d, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 603a-607, 1101-1105, 1301-1382e (1982) (establishing mandatory unemployment insurance
program funded by federal government and employers and administered by states); Insurance
Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3126 (1982) (establishing tax to fund social security
program); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (establishing minimum labor standards, including minimum wage); Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 553, 651-678 (1982 & Supp. 111984) (authorizing Secretary of Labor to set
mandatory occupational safety and health standards and establishing commission to adjudicate violations of standards); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (establishing disclosure and reporting requirements and setting standards of conduct for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans); Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-441, 1001-1461 (1982) (establishing social security program).
124 See notes 39-42, 56-83 and accompanying text supra.
125 Cf. Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 Yale L.J. 793, 796 (1984) (noting
proclivity of courts to translate "essentially political struggles" into fungible "economic interest" disputes); Hyde, Economic Labor Law vs. Political Labor Relations, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(1981) (bargaining alternately hides, and is conflated with, political action).
Of course, there are other areas besides the control of collective action and actors where
the courts have undermined the goal of participation. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981) ("Management must be free from the constraints of the
bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business" (footnote
omitted)); Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (employer need not bargain over issues "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control"
including automation); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-50
(1958) (implicitly narrowing range of matters subject to mandatory negotiation); see also Summers, supra note 109, at 41 (mournful register of instances in which courts have sided with
employers to deprive workers of participation and process rights).
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others. 126 At the same time, unions are said to hamper individual workers, who would otherwise be freer to choose employers they desired and
make arrangements with them more suited to their individual preferences. 127 In short, many view unions as "rent-seeking" cartels that establish monopoly wages, often at the expense of consumers and other

employees, and stultify the entire economy. 128 They are dysfunctional,
often corrupt and crass, special interests.1 29 Although the Court has
rarely cited this literature directly in the series of cases culminating in
PatternMakers'League v. NLRB,13 0 it must have entered into their consideration of the bounds of legitimate union discipline of members and
strengthened the general preference for individual over collective
13 1
rights.
It is, therefore, all the more surprising that some of the most recent
and reliable organizational and legal-economic literature has returned to
a significant appreciation of the role of unions in the legal economic order. That awareness extends to an understanding of the essential role of
selective incentives and the need for rules fostering solidarity. Professor
Williamson, for example, studied the costs and efficiency in production
regimes and concluded that dense collective labor organization is benefi126 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 113, at 1021-23, 1027-30; Kaus, The Trouble With Unions,
Harper's, June 1983, at 23-35; see also M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at 26-93 (surveying recent
literature on subject); Freeman & Medoff, supra note 76, at 69, 70 (reporting bad press, scholarship, and malign neglect to which unions recently subjected). An internalization of this
critique has even touched leftist analysis. See C. Sabel, Work and Politics 194-231 (1982)
(stressing virtues of post-Fordism and flexible production in small scale units, frequently nonunion and outside social welfare system).
127 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 55, at 1394-96 (barriers to discharge of employees drives up
employers' costs and thus may drive down wages while impeding realization of individual
preferences).
128 See, e.g., Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 988, 999-1011
(1984); cf. T. Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations 49-51 (1980) (stressing
need to extend unionization to possible labor competitors in order to preserve monopoly effect). The notion that unions in the monopoly sector of industry do pass on high wage costs to
consumers has also been accepted by the left. See J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State
15-16, 44-48 (1973).
129 See, e.g., R. Lekachman, Greed Is Not Enough: Reaganomics 1-20 (1982); L. Thurow,
The Zero-Sum Society 54-61 (1980).
130 473 U.S. 95 (1985). The connection is, however, presented in the journal literature, and
especially forthrightly in comments and notes. See note 13 supra. Thus, too, in an otherwise
fair and even sympathetic treatment of the union position in PatternMakers, one recent law
review Comment opened with the following vision of a union strike meeting: "'What do ya
wanna do?' screams the union president over the roar of incensed union members following the
latest company contract offer. 'Strike, strike, strike,' they chant in one voice." Comment,
Right to Restrain Versus Right to Refrain: An Examination of Pattern Makers' League of
North America v. NLRB, 13 Pepperdine L. Rev. 691, 691 (1986). Given even just a normal
dose of the class condescension and individualism one might expect among nonworkers, how
could one not want to save the individual from herd pressures?
131 See notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.
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cial for "wage and benefit determination; the enhancement of productivity through human asset development; dispute settlement; efficacious
adaptation; and regard for dignity."1 32 In addition to being a useful
agency for the aggregation and specification of employee preferences,
unions lower overall governance costs by simplifying bargaining, rationalizing wage structures, sustaining cooperation, and helping cover the
risk of investment. 133 Furthermore, unions provide a "voice"-"dialog,
persuasion, and sustained organizational effort"-that will "represent
both the will of their members and the political interests of lower-income

and disadvantaged persons."1 34 All workers obtain a voice, not only
those enjoying the most marginal demand. Finally, Williamson recognizes that win or lose, unions work to create a situation in which their
members can feel that they have been treated fairly. 135 All this is not
only good for the participants per se, but for the private enterprise system itself. 136 It is a regime that serves the general, national interest and
merits support-even if one is not partial to workers.137
132 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational
Contracting 241 (1985). Williamson also acknowledges frankly that "capitalism is prone to
undervalue dignity and that institutional safeguards can sometimes be forged that help to correct the condition." Id. at 271. He also finds highly efficient the kinds of command-control
trade-offs offered in the unionized setting. Id. at 249. For an explanation of these trade-offs,
see Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L.
Rev. 481, 502, 519 (1976).
133 0. Williamson, supra note 132, at 254, 255.
134 Id. at 257 (citing Freeman & Medoff, supra note 76).
135 Id. at 271 (citing J. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 182, 183 (1985));
see also Freeman & Medoff, supra note 76, at 73 ("diluting managerial authority" helps workers obtain "a measure of due process"). Rules and voice replace whim and command, improving managerial efficiency and reducing inequity among workers, as well as between workers
and managers.
136 Some of the now-familiar indicia adduced by Freeman & Medoff bear repeating: unions
reduce quits by about 45% and increase tenure of employment by over one-third, thereby
lowering hiring and training costs; unions reduce worker competitiveness, thereby encouraging
flexibility; union demands make management more efficient in the use of other inputs; union
workers are more self-disciplined and take fewer breaks; union firms enjoy a more efficient
information flow; by standardized measures productivity in union settings is (with some exceptions) 20-25% higher than in non-union settings in the same industry; standard rates, seniority, and other union mechanisms reduce wage inequality between blue- and white-collar
workers by about 21% in the manufacturing sector and by 27% in the nonmanufacturing
sector; unions on average aid black workers by reducing black/white earning disparities and
substantially lowering black quit and dismissal rates. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 76, at 76,
79, 85, 87. Freeman & Medoff conclude that aside from the benefits provided members, "[i]n
terms of actual outcomes, unions have been more effective as a voice of the whole working
population and the disadvantaged than they have been as a monopoly institution seeking to
increase its monopoly power." Id. at 91.
137 To quote Professor Klare: "Unions provide an institutional context within which workers can formulate and express their aspirations, aggregate their voices and experience the dignity that comes with having some power to affect the decisions governing one's life." Klare,
Ideology, supra note 34, at 453. On the written page, this sounds well and good. But, if this is
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The relational contracting approach, and its promise of gain for the
production system as a whole, hinges on having an organized, forceful,
and disciplined labor force. 138 Absent these qualities, individual employees will be tempted to resist necessary authority and also to behave opportunistically, at the expense of both justice and efficiency. The role of
negative selective incentives, like union discipline, is as great or even

greater than the role of some positive inducements, like classical community solidarity-which itself, of course, contained a great deal of embed-

ded coercion. 139 One comparative historical analysis has concluded that
America's labor relations are peaceful in part because "the union's capacity to close down an enterprise against which it has called a strike is clear
to all."'1 4 Ultimately, where "stable patterns of active cooperation are
important to production" both employers and employees gain from
14 1
cartelized labor.
In the United States, as well as in most of Western Europe, unions
of the sort discussed here have been the chief vehicles of these "stable
patterns of active cooperation." For both sides, unions have mitigated
the rules of neoclassical economic models. They have often filled the
ongoing need for those "non-contractual" relations that allow "contractual" relations to work. 142 Yet the need for some sort of mitigating or-

ganization in the workplace may obviously be filled successfully by
unions of a different sort. The spectacular success of the very different
true and unionization at the same time serves the general interest of the workers, then the
industrial legal order ought to be hegemonic. It isn't. For reasons why this might be so, see .
Cohen & J. Rogers, supra note 72, at 47-145; M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at 115-245; A.
Przeworski, supra note 72, at 7-46, 133-222; Freeman, The Evolution of the American Labor
Market, 1948-80, in The American Economy in Transition 349, 368-71 (M. Feldstein ed.
1980).
138 See 0. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 75,
81 (1975).
139 See notes 85-95 and accompanying text supra.
140 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social
Rigidities 21 (1982). This contrasts with an earlier period when "a great deal of violence on
the part of both unions and anti-union employers and scabs" took place. Id. at 22. Olson
observes that some supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act devoutly expected that impartial, government-sponsored plebiscites would reveal that many or most union members did not really
want to belong, but were coerced into joining. It turned out, however, that "the same workers
who had to be coerced to pay union dues voted for the unions with compulsory dues (and
normally by overwhelming margins) .... Id. In the aggregate, workers, like other people,
are fully aware of the leverage that selective incentives provide those who would undertakeor who rely on others undertaking-collective action.
141 Id.
142 See E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 200-29 (1933) (classic statement of
continued development and essential need for non-economic, non-contractual relations, especially as scope of contract enlarges); see also Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963) (businessmen involved in long-term
relationships rarely sue each other over their conflicts).
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Japanese model, with its "quality circles" and non-contentious unions, 14 3
144
amply demonstrates this possibility.
2. How May Unions Be Able to Do It?
Given the obvious centrality of the strike as a weapon for unions,
and the concern of the courts with those strikes, it bears being reminded
that "strikes do not seem to cost society a substantial amount of goods
and services." 145 A record of disruption is surely not the cause of current
union weaknesses or judicial unwillingness to permit unions effective use

of necessary selective incentives.146 There is little if any basis for taking
exception to the conclusion reached years ago by Professor Olson: "By
far the most important single factor enabling large, national unions to
survive was that membership in those unions, and support of the strikes
they called, was to a great degree compulsory." 147 Where "classical"
unionism relied heavily on community sanctions to deter temptations,
the industrial order established in the NLRA legalizes sanctions in the
form of selective incentives.1 48 These affect both individual employees
1 49
and the struck employer, the former in a very powerful way.
143 See, e.g., R. Cole, Japanese Blue Collar (1971); A. Cook, An Introduction to Japanese
Trade Unionism (1966); K. Okochi, Workers and Employers in Japan (1974); E. Vogel, Japan
as Number One: Lessons for America (1980).
144 See T. Kochan, H. Katz & R. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial
Relations (1986) (American system in transition with declining union influence and altering of
workplace regimes and strategies).
145 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 76, at 81. "For the economy as a whole, the percentage
of total working time lost directly to strikes" from about 1960 to 1980 averaged .2% per year.
Id. at 81-82.
146 Professor Goldfield attributes current union weakness to a growing business offensive
that has been "meeting with increased success in defeating attempts at new union organizing;"
changes in public policy that come in waves (in 1947, 1959, 1978, and 1981) and tend "to favor
more and more the employers;" and the failure by most unions "to devote the energies and
resources necessary" to combat these tendencies. M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at 179, 231.
Goldfield rejects as an explanation for union weakness arguments based on the economic structure or the business cycle.
147 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 68
(1965) (emphasis added).
148 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 411(a)(5) (1982).
149 The great anomaly, not to say injustice, of NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938), was that it created a decisive asymmetry by allowing struck employers to
hire "replacements." See id. at 345-46; note 23 and accompanying text supra. As Olson
points out:
[F]or those who continue working, or for outside strikebreakers, wages will if anything
be higher than they were before [the strike began]. By contrast, for the duration of the
conflict the strikers get nothing. Thus all the economic incentives affecting individuals
are on the side of those workers who do not respect the picket lines. Should it be surprising, then, that coercion should be applied to keep individual workers from succumbing to the temptation to work during the strike?
M. Olson, supra note 147, at 71.
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If the Pattern Makers Court and other courts were concerned with
enforcing the congressional mandate of securing the free flow of commerce, 150 then, to avoid economic disruption and bring strikes to an end,
they would either institutionalize a universal system of compulsory binding arbitration or strengthen barriers to strikebreaking. 51 The individual worker will, after a strike, obtain all the benefits achieved by the
union whether he or she supported it in its struggles or not. 15 2 There is,
therefore, little incentive for the individual worker to see any strike
through to the end once his or her private costs begin to mount. The
proper administrative and judicial response to this situation was once
recognized in the War Labor Board's "maintenance of membership"
rule. According to that regulation, anyone joining a union, for whatever
reason, was obligated to remain a member until the next contract was
1 53
signed.
The "maintenance of membership" provision protected the employee's freedom to choose whether or not to become a union member
while providing the union with security against the decomposition that
might follow upon employer attacks or loss of employee interest.1 54 Es150 The NLRA begins by attesting that:
[T]he refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead[s]
to strikes... which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce ....

Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment or interruption,
and promotes the flow of commerce ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
151 See Chamberlain, The Problem of Union Security, 26 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. 4 (1954).
Olson makes this point explicitly: "When the majority of the workers in a particular bargaining unit vote to... strike, all of the workers in that unit should be barred by law from flouting
the majority decision by attempting" to work. M. Olson, supra note 147, at 72.
Because compulsory binding arbitration tends to balance the scales in a bargaining situation, it would help new and weak unions but not necessarily stronger, established unions. It
was a favored mechanism of interwar European social democrats. See 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics, supra note 40, at 173-76; Abraham, supra note 72, at 231-34, 246-49;
see also Weiler, supra note 31, at 405-12 (advocating compulsory arbitration of first contracts
to counter employer resistance).
152 See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954) (union may not discriminate against non-union unit members in bargaining for higher wages).
153 H. Millis & E. Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft Hartley 296-98 (1950) (discussing
"maintenance of membership" rule and its contribution to low strike frequency). The shortterm purpose of the rule was to hasten the resolution of disputes and prevent industrial conflict
from obstructing the war effort.
Professor Wellington indicates that "maintenance-of-membership clause[s]" now appear
in only 4% of all collective bargaining agreements and generally do not extend to the start of
the next contract. Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 Yale L.J. 1022, 1041-42
(1976).
154 See, e.g., Little Steel Cos., I War Lab. Rep. 325, 339-42 (1942) (provision protected
freedom of choice for worker and provided security for union); Federal Shipbldg. & Drydock
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pecially important in the wartime setting, but not unique to it, the provision facilitated a union's fulfilment of its collective bargaining obligation
to discipline members who proffered frivolous grievances or encouraged
wildcat strikes.15 5 It might appear natural for unions to score such gains
during periods of full employment and tight labor markets and to lose
them afterwards. But the point of labor policy should be to secure such
gains for times when rational apathy, opportunism, and free riding return. After all, only "the union as an organization, not the worker directly" 156 can obtain the needed measure of job control to assure some
justice, "promote industrial stabilization," "achieve industrial peace,"
' 157
and "maintain uninterrupted production."
Olson summed up the real significance of these issues a generation
ago, employing a logic perhaps difficult for courts to adopt.1 58 And it is
well worth recalling his conclusions before embarking upon an analysis
of the recent Supreme Court cases:
Arguments about compulsory union membership in terms of [individual] "rights" are... misleading and unhelpful .... [They cannot] rest alone on the premise that... compulsory unionism restrict[s]
individual freedom, unless the argument is extended to cover all coercion used to support the provision of collective services. There is no
less infringement of "rights" through taxation for the support of a
police force or a judicial system than there is a union shop. Of course,
law and order are requisites of all organized economic activity ....
[Debates over union coercive powers] should center, not around the
"rights" involved, but on whether or not a country would be better off
if its unions were stronger or weaker.
Co., 1 War Lab. Rep. 140, 143-44 (1942) (provision provided protection against union disintegration); International Harvester Co., 1 War Lab. Rep. 112, 122-25 (1942) (granting union use
of provision where employer demonstrably hostile to union).
155 See, e.g., Ryan Aeronautical Co., 1 War Lab. Rep. 305 (1942) (provision aided union in
fulfilling its obligations); Realty Advisory Bd. on War Relations, Inc., 2 War Lab. Rep. 183
(1942) (outlining various tradeoffs of security for cooperation); cf. Gould, Solidarity Forever,
supra note 21, at 89 (discussing Board's and Court's treatment of analogous security provisions
in UAW constitution during 1970s).
156 M. Olson, supra note 147, at 87.
157 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582 (1960)
(enunciating goals of Act and advocating arbitration).
158 There is little, if any, doubt that Olson's book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups, has been one of the most influential pieces in political,
sociological, and organizational studies in the past generation. Its method and results have
been applied to an immense range of questions and by a wide variety of social scientists. See
M. Olson, supra note 147. It is interesting, therefore, to discover that, as of December 1988, it
has been cited by name only four times in federal judicial opinions, once in 1972, twice in 1987,
and once in 1988. See Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, C.J.,
dissenting); Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir.
1987); Premiere Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 370 (6th
Cir. 1987); LaRaza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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...For if, under all circumstances, the individual has a "right to
work" [or to withdraw from the union], surely he must have the "right
not to fight" (the right to avoid [or withdraw from] military service),
and the "right not to spend" (the right to avoid paying taxes for government services he does not want). Collective bargaining, war, and
the basic government services are alike in that the "benefits" of all
three go to everyone in the relevant group, whether or not he has supported the union, served in the military, or paid the taxes. Compulsion
is involved in all three, and has to be. 159
The reasonable question, therefore, is not whether society, the em-

ployer, the union, or the member is exposed to compulsion. The question
as between the union and the member is whether that compulsion was
agreed to by citizen-members, quasi-contractually, democratically, and
with full participation rights. 16°
II
EMPOWERMENT AND AUTONOMY IN THE COURTS:
RESIGNATION AND STRIKEBREAKING

A.
1.

Whittling Down the Meaning of Membership

The Allis-Chalmers StartingPoint

It has been a stable assumption in American labor law that a union
cannot compel an employer to bargain with it, let alone make any concessions to it, unless it can apply economic pressure and do so effectively.

Thus, for both sides, "the presence of economic weapons in reserve, and
their actual exercise upon occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of
the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized" despite "the most serious effect upon individual workers and productive

enterprises."

161

159 M. Olson, supra note 147, at 88-90; c. Weiler, supra note 31, at 397 (cast in idiom
tangibly different from Olson's but reaching similar position).
160 Of course, compulsion could be used for ends not essential to the survival of the union or
in plain violation of the law (such as racial discrimination, racketeering, etc.). In such instances, primarily through the duty of fair representation, this analysis would not apply. See
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Really Do in Fact, 70 Yale L.J. 175
(1960); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951). Contra Wellington, supra note 153, at 1041, 1045, 1059 (jealous in guarding individual member's
rights; supporting "Miranda rights" for prospective members; denying "mutual reliance" perspective); cf. Summers, Trade Unions and Their Members (Fall 1987) (manuscript) (on file at
New York University Law Review) (moving toward more solidarity-oriented position in matters involving employer).
161 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). The employer can
choose from a number of options to counter a union's exercise of economic pressure. These
include the following: operating with permanent replacements, NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); subcontracting work out, Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321
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The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing

Co.162 construed union membership as a contract, 163 and, as a matter of

internal governance, permitted fines for acts such as strikebreaking, so
long as the fines were not coercively stiff, arbitrary, vague, or contrary to
procedural guarantees. 164 In practice, this could mean unions suing for
breach in state courts under the law of contracts, voluntary associations,
and the like. 165 These disciplinary actions were considered less drastic
severe and disruptive
than expulsion, which the Court took to be a more
16 6
discipline, yet one permitted by the statute.
The consequences of democratic majority rule and the union's duty

to act effectively as exclusive bargaining representative under section 9(a)
of the NLRA 167 were announced forthrightly by the Allis-Chalmers
Court: "The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to
be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory
bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always
to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its dis-

cretion." 168 The pivotal NLRA section 8(b)(1) terms "restrain or coF.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963); undertaking preemptive lockouts, American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); or simply letting time, financial pressures, and adverse publicity
wear down the union's bargaining position.
162 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
163 Id. at 179. In construing union membership as a contract, the Court looked at it as one
rather like a constitution, to which the concept of "adhesion" would not apply. The Court
hinted that the enforcement of penalties was no more restraint or coercion than was the "enforcement of penalties on citizens for violation of their obligations.., to pay income taxes, or
Id. An employee's
court awards... for nonperformance of a contractual obligation ....
right to hold a job without joining a union and to gain equally from the union's negotiating
successes without being a member of the union is secure. See notes 7-10, 152 supra. Further,
although the union member may not bargain over the terms of his membership contract, the
union's constitution, bylaws, and such are the fruits of a process that must be democratic and
may be revised or repealed. See notes 7-10 supra.
164 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 182, 192. "Coercion," according to the Court, was to be
measured by the standards of§ 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982), and the
procedural guarantees of § 101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5)
(1982). Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 192-95.
165 Thus, the reasonableness of union fines could become an issue for state courts under
contract law and voluntary association law, along with remedies such as liquidated damages.
NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74 (1973) (implementing logic ofAllis-Chalmers by holding
that NLRA does not prohibit imposition of union fines "not affecting the employer-employee
relationship").
166 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 183. Although expulsion might be more severe, it is less
adequate since it can fracture the workforce and can lead to weaker, rival unions. See Summers, The Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 487, 495 (1950)
(noting that strikebreaking is almost invariably grounds for expulsion because it "undercuts
the union's principle weapon and defeats the economic objective for which the union exists").
167 29 U.S.C. § 149(a) (1982).
168 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181 (citations omitted). Good faith, honesty of purpose, and
the like can be seen as a bridge to the duty of fair representation. That duty was underscored
by the Court earlier that same year in another decision. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182
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erce," 169 wrote Justice Brennan for the Court, had to be understood in
the context of ample evidence of congressional intent to allow unions to
govern their own internal affairs and to act effectively. "The policy
therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own
relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen
representative .. .-. 17o The usefulness of a weapon so essential as the
strike could not be imperilled by the refusal to permit the assessment of
reasonable fines against members in violation. Justice Brennan observed
the special salience of the issue for weak unions: "[I]t is just such weak
unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory
17 1
function."
Congress had indeed intended in section 8(b)(1)(A) to impose restrictions analogous to those imposed on employers on a union's ability
to "restrain or coerce" in the realm of "organizational tactics," but the
restrictions were clearly "inapplicable to the relationship of a union
member to his own union."172 That relationship was addressed in the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, which enacted democratic and procedural
requirements for unions, 17 3 but expressly affirmed that members may be
"fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined ... -174 That two
different logics were at work seemed clear to the Court: "Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to
which he refuses to adhere, but he has of course no role in employer
conduct .... ,, 175 The "internal affairs" of the union, a free association,
were not to be interfered with, even if Congress in 1947 strove to
strengthen employers as a class against unions as a class.
The Allis-Chalmers dissent 176 chose to attack the majority position
(1967) (grant of power to union to act as exclusive bargaining agent gives rise to duty to
represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit).
169 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982).
170 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 180. This is, in fact, precisely what the strikebreaker does;
he orders his own relations with the employer.
171Id. at 184. This position is, of course, entirely consonant with the logic of collective
action. See notes 147-58 and accompanying text supra.
172 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 190-91; see note 6 supra.
173 Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 101, 73 Stat. 522 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)
(1982)).
174 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982).
175 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 191. In the case at bar, the strikebreaking workers had each
"executed the pledge of allegiance to the UAW constitution and took the oath of full membership.... [T]wo disciplined employees testified that they had fully participated in the proceedings leading to the strike. They attended the meetings at which the secret strike vote and the
renewed strike vote were taken." Id. at 196.
176 Id. at 199 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Both Black's
penchant for finding "the plain meaning" of the law and Douglas's relentless individualism
permeate the dissent. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
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as a policy choice clothed in the guise of law.1 77 The dissenters perceived

no legal basis for public enforcement of union fines levied against members, and they thereby began the restoration, in the labor law area, of the
pristine world of freely contracting atomistic individuals. The dissent
reasoned that if the NLRA insulates an employee's job from any union
membership requirement (as distinct from agency service fees), as section
8(b)(2) clearly does, the worker's relationship to his union becomes no
different from his relationship to his employer.178 The dissent, in treating
the union and the employer as the goose and the gander, 179 overlooked
one critical fact: whereas the employer may hire replacement workers,
including current or former union members, the union cannot hire replacement strikers. The only available response to Mackay's legalization
of an employer's hiring strike replacements 80 is J... Case's insistence on
the union's exclusive bargaining rights and the prohibition of separate
181
deals with individual workers.
When Allis-Chalmers was decided in 1967,182 it was, and for a long
time continued to be, widely perceived as a strong endorsement of collectivity, of a union's solidarity rights vis-a-vis, and conceivably at the expense of, its members.1 83 There was good reason to think that this was
177 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 201-02 (Black, J., dissenting). As the dissent put it:

The real reason for the Court's decision is its policy judgment that unions, especially
weak ones, need the power to impose fines on strikebreakers and to enforce those fines in
court ....
Though the entire mood in Congress in 1947 was to curtail the power of
unions... in order to equalize the power of the two [sides], the Court is unwilling to
believe that Congress intended to impair "the usefulness of labor's cherished strike
weapon." I cannot agree with this conclusion or subscribe to the Court's unarticulated
premise that the Court has power to add a new weapon to the union's economic arsenal
whenever the Court believes that the union needs that weapon.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
178 Id. at 206 (Black, J., dissenting).
179 "What was sauce for the goose under the Wagner Act is now sauce for the gander under
the Taft-Hartley Act." Capital Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1953)
(citation omitted) (explaining parallel nexus between § 7 and § 8(a)(1) for employer and
§ 8(b)(1)(A) for union), aff'd, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); see notes 70-76 and accompanying text
supra.
18o NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938); see notes 23-24 and
accompanying text supra.
181 J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336-38 (1944); see notes 25-26 and accompanying
text supra.
182 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
183 See, e.g., Archer, Allis-Chalmers Recycled: A Current View of a Union's Right to Fine
Employees for Crossing a Picket Line, 7 Ind. L. Rev. 498 (1974) (expressing fear that AllisChalmers and subsequent cases do not reflect congressional intent to restrain union's disciplinary power); Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines: The NLRA and Union Disciplinary
Power, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 681, 691-700 (1970) (fearing that overly broad empowerment of
union would impair members' rights); Craver, The Boeing Decision: A Blow to Federalism,
Individual Rights, and Stare Decisis, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 556, 559-70 (1974) (same); Gould,
Some Limitations upon Union Discipline Under the NLRA: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 Duke L.J. 1067, 1137 (advocating strict scrutiny of union discipline by Board and
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true, even if subsequent fears of more widespread union misconduct
184
were, and remain, unjustified.

Yet, for all its apparent strength, Allis-Chalmers contained an Achil18 5
If
les heel: its principles applied only to current union members.
union members were to find themselves in financial straits or a philosophical position where they deemed it necessary to break the strike they
had voted to undertake, and were willing to face a certain amount of peer
hostility,18 6 they might consider resigning from the union before crossing
the picket line. ls 7 After Allis-Chalmers this was a scenario waiting to be
tested-by scholars, employers, desperate workers, and ultimately the
NLRB itself, each perhaps for different reasons.188
noting that Allis-Chalmers provides unions with excessive latitude); Wellington, supra note
153, at 1023 (in encouraging undermining of decision noting that Allis-Chalmers "inhibited the
assertion, and jeopardized the vindication, of workers' rights"); Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1536, 1549-60 (1973) (advocating framework
narrower than that adopted in Allis-Chalmers). But see Gould, supra note 21, at 75 n.5 (noting
that "[s]ubsequent events and a reanalysis of the union's interest... have instigated a moderate retraction of my earlier opinions"); Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline
After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers, and Scofield, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 187, 190-91, 198
(1969) (Allis-Chalmersproperly restricts § 8(b)(1)(A) to cases of union pressure on non-union
employees).
184 See note 183 supra. Insofar as commentators expressed fear of a green light for union
abuse, it should be noted that a broad range of remedies was already in place. For example, if
a strike violates a collective agreement, and the union refuses arbitration, say against the
wishes of dissenting members, the employer may often obtain an injunction. See Boys Mkts.,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970) (employer entitled to injunction where union violates mandatory arbitration provision of collective agreement). If there is
improper secondary picketing, in which dissenters wish not to participate, a § 8(b)(4) violation
has been committed anyway. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982). Union members disciplined for
criticizing officials or advocating reform may seek remedy in federal court. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 41 1(a), 412 (1982). A union that discriminates against nonmembers in the bargaining unit
in order to encourage union membership violates the duty of fair representation. See Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954) (union may not bargain for higher wages for
its supporters or members than for others in unit); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 489 F.2d 635, 638 (5th Cir.) (union may not bargain for preference in job referrals based
on citizenship and residence), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974). One recent observer has
trenchantly commented that
[i]n creating new unfair labor practice liability that interferes with the internal affairs of
unions, the courts and the Board have usurped Congress's role of distributing economic
weapons between employers and unions.... [Even the Landrum-Griffin Act] did not
outlaw all union sanctions opposed to the policies of the NLRA. Rather, it provided
remedies in the district courts, not before the Board, for union measures restricting
speech, assembly, or violating certain procedural requirements.
Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(A) from Allis-Chalmers to Pattern Makers' League, 74 Calif. L.
Rev. 1409, 1441 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
185 Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196-97.
186 See notes 91-95 and accompanying text supra.
187 See, e.g., Wellington, supra note 153, at 1023 (worker "can immunize himself from
union fines by resigning his union membership" before violating union rules).
188 See, e.g., id. at 1038 (possibility of resigning from union before crossing picket line
"holds promise for [those] who decide that the potential liability for breaking union rules
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Turning Allis-Chalmers on Its Head

a. "'Legitimate"Internal Affairs: Marine Workers and Scofield.
Not long after Allis-Chalmers, the Court, in a period characterized by
vigorous civil rights activity, moved to enhance the individual rights of
the union member. In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 189 the Court placed a limit on the permissible construction
of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso permitting a union to prescribe its own
internal rules. 190 Public law appeared to point to protection of the individual rather than the collectivity. Thus, the Court found an unfair labor
practice on the part of a union when it expelled a member for filing an
unfair labor practice charge against it without first exhausting the internal remedies mandated by the union's constitution.191 The Court emphasized the problematic distinction between "legitimate internal affairs"
and matters governed by the individual rights available in the "public
domain." 1 92 Apparently, even matters the circuit court had found to be
at the core of a union's institutional life and interest had to be circumscribed by inalienable individual rights. 193 The message communicated
outweighs the advantages of being a union member"). It would thus seem that Professor Wel-

lington not only foretold the Court's decision in Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S.
95 (1985), but may have helped precipitate it: "The Board must take steps not only to prevent
unions from unduly restricting the right of resignation, but also to require that unions inform
members of their freedom to resign with impunity." Wellington, supra note 153, at 1041.
Compare Gould, supra note 183, at 1108 (expressing fear that "unscrupulous management"
might undertake "union busting" by counseling resignations) with Wellington, supra note 153,
at 1052 n.156 (rejecting "union busting" concern). But see Granite State Joint Bd., 185
N.L.R.B. 380, 392 (1970) (clear evidence that employer procured resignation letters as part of
effort to break strike); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 446 F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1971)
(employer informed all striking employees of favorable aspect of trial examiner's preliminary
decision), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). Perhaps an employer might not dare subvert a powerful
major union with such tactics, but what of the much more common weak union, like the
GraniteState textile workers' union, about which the Allis-Chalmers majority voiced concern?
See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184 (1967) (weak unions most in need of
statutory protection); see also notes 245-50 and accompanying text infra.
189 391 U.S. 418, 426 (1968).
190 This proviso, § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, preserves "the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ......
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982).
191Marine Workers, 391 U.S. at 424. The Court thereby adopted the position put forth by
the Board in an earlier decision. Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs (Charles S.
Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 684 (1964) (despite bylaws, union may not fine member for filing
unfair labor practice charge against union prior to exhausting internal remedies).
192 Marine Workers, 391 U.S. at 424-25; cf. A Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289 (1982) (distinction between public and private highly problematic in nearly all areas of law, including labor law).
193 See Marine Workers, 391 U.S. at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit had
found no overriding public interest or individual right. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 418 (1968). The
Third Circuit determined that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) protected a union's authority to
expel a member for filing charges with the NLRB if that employee had failed to exhaust the
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was that only with the greatest hesitancy and oversight may any selfgoverning collectivity stand between the individual and the state.194 The
Court appeared to be concerned both with the protection of unions as
bargaining representatives and with the protection of individual employee freedom from union disciplinary powers.
Rather than achieving a fruitful balance, however, the Court discussed these two concerns in a manner that generated further tension. In
Scofield v. NLRB, 195 the Court addressed the question of whether a
union could suspend or fine members for producing in excess of agreedupon daily piecework outputs and cashing in, rather than banking, the
excess produced. 196 After the union had fined the employees in question,
it sought to collect the fines in state court.1 97 The employees, in turn,

filed charges with the NLRB asserting that the union had attempted to
coerce them into engaging in union activities, in violation of section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. 198 The Court saw that a core union interest
was involved; this was not a potentially gratuitous urge for centralized
control but rather an interest implicating the union's ability to function
as the exclusive bargaining representative with the employer.1 9 9 If production were allowed to exceed accepted ceilings, the employer would
surely press for either lower rates or higher quotas. Under such an analysis, rate-busting is not a permissible exercise of individual worker
200
autonomy.
Rather than satisfying itself with evocation of its J.. Case
decision 20 1 and the exclusive representation mandate of section
internal appeals process first. The court would not have countenanced such an expulsion if the
rule had prevented members from ever filing charges with the NLRB, but, according to the
court's reasoning, to require members to resort to internal appeals processes first was consonant with both the principles of unionism and the law. Id. at 707.
194 This problem is the liberal democratic version of the problem of totalitarianism. See F.
Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modem Society, in The Democratic and
Authoritarian State 22-68 (H. Marcuse ed. 1957); F. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, in The Democratic and Authoritarian State, 160-200 (H. Marcuse ed. 1957); see also
note 82 supra.
195 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
196 Id. at 424-25.
197 Id. at 426.
198 Id. at 426-27. But cf. Gould, supra note 21, at 109 & n.188 (employers frequently pay
costs of union fines and suits against unions nominally filed by employees).
199 Scofield, 394 U.S. at 434-35.
200 Historically, of course, rate-busting violated group norms and engendered a great deal of
peer hostility; unless a fellow worker was in temporary dire straits, it was one of the more
disloyal things he could do. Generally speaking, only older employees with more seniority and
low levels of group integration could afford to bust rates. See, e.g., M. Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent, supra note 91, at 145-46, 165-69 (profiling classic and contemporary rate
busters).
201 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 322, 326-29 (1944) (contract between individual employee and employer is subordinated to collective bargaining agreement between union and
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9(a), 20 2 the Court chose to sketch the borders of the self-government proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). Justice White declared that a union may go to
court to "enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate
union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor
laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to
leave the union and escape the rule. ' 20 3 As impressive as multi-pronged
tests may often be, the Scofield test proved to be an invitation to further
conflicts-social conflict as to the bounds of legitimate union interests,
judicial and political-administrative conflict (in and over the Board) as to
what Congress had or had not imbedded in the law, and internecine conflicts among workers, some of them tempted to leave the unions and es2 °4
cape the rules at opportune times.
b. The Declining Value of One's Word: Granite State and Booster
Lodge. In NLRB v. GraniteState JointBoard,205 the Court was faced for
the first time with employees who resigned from their union before becoming strikebreakers-but not before they each had voted, at two sepa-6
20
rate meetings, to strike and to authorize fines against strikebreakers.
Neither the collective agreement nor the union constitution contained a
clear provision regarding resignations from the union, and the particular
maintenance-of-membership clause that had been in effect concerned
only dues payments during the course of the contract whose expiration
precipitated the strike. 20 7 After the employees resigned from the union
and returned to work, the union fined the employees and then attempted
to collect the fines in state court. 20 8 The employees filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the union, and the NLRB ruled that the union
had unlawfully coerced the employees in the exercise of their right to
20 9
refrain from striking.
employer).
202 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982); see note 25 supra.
203 Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430.
204 The Court subsequently refined the Scofield rules. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S.
67, 74 (1973) (Act does not empower Board to judge reasonableness of union fines; plaintiffs
may challenge fines under state contract or voluntary association laws). One might reasonably
ask whether Boeing should not also apply to fines imposed for violation of commitments lawfully undertaken by union members not to engage in strikebreaking.
205 409 U.S. 213 (1972), rev'g 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), denying enforcement to 187
N.L.R.B. 636 (1970).
206 NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 446 F.2d 369, 370 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409
U.S. 213 (1972). Justice Douglas's rendering of the events creates the impression that these
workers were bystanders rather than active participants in the decisions to strike and to fine
strikebreakers. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 214.
207 GraniteState, 409 U.S. at 214.
208 Id.

209 Id.. at 214-15. On the substantial involvement of employers in the filing of unfair labor
charges, see generally note 181 supra.
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In an opinion at once thoughtful and realistic, the First Circuit
found three bases for upholding the union's actions as an autonomous
union matter. First, the court reasoned that enforcement of a person's
word is equitable when others act in reliance on it.210 The court elaborated on this meaning of trust:
[Mutual reliance is implicit in all strike votes; many employees would
hesitate to forego several weeks or months of pay if they knew their
cohorts were free to cross the picket line at any time merely by resigning from the union.... The union can enforce an employee's
agreement to strike since2 11it has embarked on the strike in reliance on

his promise to honor it.

Without such trust and mutual reliance, each worker is the captive of
each other worker's individualism and the uncertainties of a freedom that
is no freedom at all, but only a prisoner's optimization. And, even where
2 12
intentions are the best, trust needs help.
Second, the First Circuit concluded that a worker could, by his
choices and actions, waive his section 7 right to refrain from concerted
activity. 21 3 Resigning "mid-strike" was not a way to abstain or forbear.
Thus, "although [section] 7 gives an employee the right to refuse to undertake and involve himself in union activities, it does not necessarily
give him the right to abandon these activities in mid-course once he has
'214
undertaken them voluntarily.
Finally, the circuit court held that section 8(b)(1)(A) did not bar
judicial enforcement of union strikebreaking fines because there was "no
evidence in the legislative history of any intent that section 8(b)(1)(A)
apply to union-employee agreements and obligations that have been undertaken voluntarily and without coercion. ' 21 5 Enforcement of the
210 Granite State, 446 F.2d at 372 (citing the "mutual subscriptions" reasoning in IA A.
Corbin, Contracts § 198, at 210 (1963)).
211 Id. (footnote omitted). The circuit court offered a hypothetical of three workers who
decide to strike "on the condition that they all agree to stick it out for the duration of the
strike." Id.
212 Professor Hardin puts the role of trust or mutual reliance (as opposed to altruism) in the
infinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma as follows:
[O]ne can trust another if one knows there will be opportunity to sanction the other if
one's trust proves to have been misplaced. This may seem to distort the meaning we
often have in speaking of "trust," since some of us may trust selected others under more
difficult circumstances, such as when the only sanctions against them for abusing our
trust would be from their own consciences. But [Ruskin's delineation] captures much of
the behavioral source of trust,..."I cannot trust other people without perpetual looking after them." The sociologist's traditional notion that a weave of mutual expectations
holds society together is not an extrarational notion.
R. Hardin, supra note 88, at 186-87.
213 Granite State, 446 F.2d at 373.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 373-74.
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union's fines would override no federal labor policy. "Voluntary" unionism certainly suggests being able to join and leave unions, to adhere or
escape their rules, but not "at any time and under all circumstances. '2 16
In a series of locutions at once lapidary and apodictic, Justice Douglas dismissed the analysis of the First Circuit and offered a theory of
resignation-at-will: in effect, union members may resign at any time and
under any circumstances. 217 The matter was, after all, not complicated.
"Neither the contract nor the Union's constitution or bylaws contained
any provision defining or limiting the circumstances under which a member could resign. ' 21 8 And where no explicit contract limits an individual, who may dare tread on his freedom? For Douglas, the market and
contract are part of nature (and resigning union members are naturally
subject only to any arrears they may owe at the time of their resignation).219 It is a limit of liberal legalism that it finds contractual relations
"natural" but not so other bonds.
Hence, the Supreme Court informs us that association and community are not natural. They are products of "pressures for conformity and
submission to [a] regime. '220 As a consequence, they may be permitted
to exist only insofar as they are formally contracted. Accordingly,
the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than
the union-member contract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a
union and thereafter engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct .... When there is a lawful
dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control
over the former member than it has over the man in the street. 2 21
As for the logic of collective action, trust, mutual reliance, and the pecu216
217
218

Id. at 374.

NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213, 216-18 (1972).
Id. at 214. In fact, the union had in practice established a 10-day per year "escape rule,"
during which time the union accepted resignations. Id. at 217 n.5. The Court skirted the
matter of the validity of this practice and followed the First Circuit's rejection of the rule on
the ground that members were unaware of it. Id. Nevertheless, there was evidence that other
employees did follow the proper procedure for resignation. See Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1536, 1546 n.58 (1973) [hereinafter Note, Union
Power] (citing union's Brief in Support of Exceptions at 2, filed in initial NLRB proceedings);
Note, The Right of Unions to Fine Members Who Have Engaged in Strikebreaking Activities
After Resigning from the Union During a Strike, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1272, 1281 (1972) (considering mutual reliance).
219 Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216.
220 Id. at 218.
221 Id. at 217. Contra Gould, supra note 21, at 104-05 ("The superficial illogic of precluding unions from controlling nonmembers is indeed erroneous."). Gould provides examples of
union membership requirements for traineeships, and hiring halls and notes that racial discrimination was permissible before 1964. Id. (citing W. Gould, Black Workers in White
Unions 281-315 (1977)).
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liar power-property nature of the wage relation, "[w]e give that factor
little weight. ' 222 Free men may change their minds. With freedom to
choose vouchsafed, Justice Douglas could ignore the "long and consistent adherence" to an alternative, majoritarian line of contemporary
Court analysis of section 7,223 and conclude that indeed the very "vitality
of section 7 requires that the [union] member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May .... "224 In fact, the former
members did not simply "refrain" from demonstrable strike support activities; they made separate deals and returned to work for the struck
employer as strikebreakers. 225 In the space of its four-page GraniteState
decision, the Court thwarted the function and jettisoned virtually the en226
tire raison d'&re of labor law.
Although some commentators read GraniteState narrowly, relegating its most egregious features to the realm of dictum, 227 in subsequent
cases the Court and the NLRB both proceeded to sharpen its bite. The
year after Granite State, the Court decided Booster Lodge 405, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. NLRB. 228 Booster Lodge pointed further down the Court's logical road on the question of union solidarity,
member autonomy, resignations, and strikebreaking. It confirmed that
union efforts to constrain (former) members was a form of prohibited
external regulation of employment opportunities rather than permissible
internal self-governance and that union rules cannot operate on (former)
members by implication. 229 Where GraniteState concluded that no individual commitment may be inferred from participation in strike votes or
strike activity, 23 0 the Court in Booster Lodge implied that a union con222 GraniteState, 409 U.S. at 217. "Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have
unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind." Id.
223 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975). In Emporium Capwell, Justice Marshall underscored that "[section 7 rights] are, for
the most part, collective rights, rights to act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are
protected notfor theirown sake but as an instrumentof the national labor policy of minimizing
industrial strife 'by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.'" Id.
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)) (emphasis added). It is disturbing to note that the black
dissident unionists in Emporium Capwell, who sought improved treatment for minority employees, were in need of discipline whereas the white strikebreaking "dissidents" in Granite
State needed only their liberty to return to work for their struck employer.
224 GraniteState, 409 U.S. at 217-18.
225 Id. at 214.
226 See notes 29-35, 97-125 and accompanying text supra.
227 See, e.g., Gould, supra note 21, at 90-91 ("GraniteState dicta is troublesome" but not
essential core of decision); Wellington, supra note 153, at 1041-43 ("In Granite State, the
Court plainly reserved the question of a union's power to develop... restrictions" on the right
to resign).
228 412 U.S. 84 (1973), aff'g 495 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972), enforcing 185 N.L.R.B. 380
(1970).
229 Id. at 89.
230 NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972); see notes 205-211 and ac-
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tract may limit none of an employee's post-resignation activities. 23 1 The
union constitution in question did not formally restrict resignations, but
it did require a member to refrain from abandoning any strike called by
the membership. 2 32 The Court for its part, however, looked past that to
hold that the employees had not agreed explicitly to any limitation on
resignations and that no post-resignation commitment could be lawfully
23 3
inferred from prior membership.
The Court found no evidence that the resigning union members understood their initial enrollment in the union as clearly obligating them
not to accept employment with the struck employer in the event they
resigned from the union. 234 Thus, not only did the Court dismiss prior
actions and mutual reliance as irrelevant to post-resignation conduct, 235
but it also appeared that the Court henceforth would require a union to
write explicit solidarity commitments and constraints into its contracts
with its members before the Court would even consider restrictions on
either resignation or post-resignation conduct. 236 In requiring that such
conduct be explicitly proscribed, the Court appeared to attribute little
cash value to either habits of mutuality or understandings of
membership.
B.

The Accelerated Assault on Solidarity: The Union as Subjugator
and What to Do About It

The Court in Booster Lodge 405, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. NLRB 237 concluded that a commitment not to break a strike
after resigning could not be deduced from either prior mutual reliance
among workers or general membership requirements in a union's constitution.238 But, at least in one reading, it left open the question of whether
an explicit proscription on either resignation or post-resignation conduct
companying text supra.
231 Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89.
232 Id. at 86 (quoting constitution of International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, art. L, § 3) (member misconduct includes "Accepting employment in any capacity in
an establishment where a strike or lockout exists")).
233 Id. at 88-89.
234 Id.
235 In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted that "the strikebreaking employees... had
all voted to strike. On the day following the inception of the strike, these employees also voted
in favor of a union resolution that anyone aiding or abetting the company during the strike
would be subject to a fine. And all had participated in the strike prior to resigning from the
union." Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
236 "[W]e are no more disposed to find an implied post-resignation commitment from the
strike-breaking proscription in the Union's constitution here than we were to find it from the
employees' participation in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in [GraniteState]." Id.

at 89-90.
237 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
238 Id. at 88-90; see notes 228-36 and accompanying text supra.
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could conceivably pass muster. Would the "right to resign" doctrine of
GraniteState prove to be the pivotal conception in the Court's treatment
of these issues? This slight opening offered encouragement to those legal
scholars who wished to salvage elements of solidarity, 239 while spurring
on those more concerned with the freedom of individual employees and
problems of contracts of adhesion. 24°
L

FacilitatingResignations, Weakening Unions

To what extent may a union legitimately restrict opportunities for
members to resign? Allis-Chalmers held that, by joining a union which
requires adherence to strike discipline, a worker waives his section 7
right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities. 24 1 This is, of
course, not really a matter of member/union relations so much as a matter of the collective interest of the workforce vis-i-vis its employer. It is
the flipside of a union's waiving the right of individual workers to strike
on their own-to "wildcat. ' 242 A "dispute between the union and the
worker" in this area "is actually part of the power struggle between labor
and management."2 43 Is there analogously a valid sense in which a
worker, by engaging in collective action through his exclusive bargaining
representative, yields some of his presumed right to resign at will? May
union constitutions or bylaws limit the opportunity to resign?
A doctrine of unrestricted resignation rights without residual obligations might well comport nicely with Justice Douglas's vision of individual freedom, 244 but it also substantially fortifies the employer's position
vis-ii-vis all his employees. 245 As one commentator has observed, resig239 See, e.g., Gould, supra note 21, at 91-93 (noting that "extent to which a union may
restrict the right to resign and the extent to which unions may regulate post-resignation conduct" remain undecided); Note, Union Power, supra note 218, at 1544-45 (although "imputing mutual reliance from implied contractual terms would seem to be fundamentally unfair"
and adhesory, "explicit restrictions on the manner of resignation should be upheld if they are
reasonable and fully known to union members").
240 See Wellington, supra note 153, at 1041, 1053 (noting that "uncertainty [still] to be
resolved," and encouraging expansive extrapolation from GraniteState and Booster Lodge).
241 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 190-91 (1967); see Weiler, supra note
31, at 395 & n.150 (detailing history of, and key cases on, employee and union waiver of § 7
rights).
242 See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939) (under no-strike clause in collective agreement individual employees waived right to strike as group of concerted individuals);
NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 789-91 (5th Cir. 1970) (because of majority
rule, wildcat strike by union members not protected by § 7).
243 Gould, supra note 21, at 112-13 (indicating also why employee in such cases are consistently represented by employer's counsel and why employers are so ready to file unfair labor
practice charges).
244 See notes 45-48, 130, 205-11 and accompanying text supra.
245 In all the key cases in this area, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175
(1967); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge 405, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973); Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95
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nation rights "create[ ] a tempting chance for the employer to engage in
subtle, informal interference aimed at encouraging members to resign
from the union in order to return to work.... The resulting uncertainty
of union support and the increased likelihood of employer recalcitrance"
make union survival more difficult and increase hostilities between labor
and management.2 46 While the union/member relationship is one of a
contract containing certain terms, 247 that relationship lies near the center
248
of a larger federal policy overseeing union/employer relations.
The Taft-Hartley Act, 249 so central to the cases analyzed in this Article, was doubtlessly intended to weaken unions. 250 But the construction of sections 7 and 8(b)(1) 25 1 need not lead to a conception of
unlimited resignation rights without residual obligations. Indeed, in
253
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,252 and Scofield v. NLRB,
the Court found in the Taft-Hartley Act, "a statutory purpose to protect
the right to refuse to undertake union activities from the beginning, but
not necessarily to protect the right to abandon specific obligations voluntarily assumed through membership. '2 54 Thus, the meaning even of the
Taft-Hartley Act remains contested. 255 The questions to answer are how
and why the NLRB and the Court moved away from the earlier reading
to a more extravagantly anti-union reading of the resignation question.

As late as the mid-1970s, the right to resign was not a major issue in
labor law. Proportionate to membership, there were few resignations
(1985), unfair labor practice charges were filed by employers who assuredly were acting primarily in their own interests and only secondarily as guardians of the individual rights of
workers. See, e.g., Granite State Joint Bd., 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 392 (1970) (along with bringing
suit, employer procured resignation letters as strikebreaking tactic); Gould, supra note 21, at
79-80 (detailing how employer came to bring unfair labor practice charges in Allis-Chalmers);
note 183 and accompanying text supra.
246 Note, Union Power, supra note 218, at 1554 (footnote and citations omitted).
247 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958) (as
contract, terms to be assessed under state law in state court).
248 See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (federal
law preemptive of union/member relations). But see id. at 320 (White, J., dissenting) (union/
member relationship separate from overall labor/management relationship, whose governance
is federal).
249 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
250 D. Caute, The Great Fear 349-400 (1979); A. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 494 (1977); Chandler, The Role of Business in the
United States, 98 Daedalus 35-58 (1969); see note 70 supra.
251 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b)(1)(A) (1982); see note 6 supra.
252 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
253 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
254 Note, Union Power, supra note 218, at 1556 (footnote omitted). The Allis-Chalmers
Court and the First Circuit argued forcefully for this reading of Taft-Hartley. Allis-Chalmers,
388 U.S. at 178-79 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1947)); NLRB v.
Granite State Joint Bd., 446 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); see notes
224-27 and accompanying text supra.
255 See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
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and few explicit prohibitions against it.256 For those workers who believed even minimally in a union, there was little to be gained by abandoning it if one intended to stay in the same workplace. 25 7 If not
solidarity, then peer pressure, inertia, and an occasional maintenance-ofmembership clause 258 served to keep membership relatively stable within
unionized plants and to discourage descent from full membership to
2 59
mere dues-equivalent agency membership.
The steady decline in union membership after 1954, from nearly
35% of the total non-agricultural labor force to about 17% in mid1987,260 has multiple causes. It is unlikely that membership resignation
within particular workplaces is the most important cause of this decline;
there are too many other powerful factors. It is clear, for example, that
the transformation of the industrial structure, the relocation of plants
and capital to non-union areas within the United States and abroad, the
exacerbated segmentation of the labor market, the new profile of entrants
into the labor market, the boldness of employers in fighting both established and new unions as well as in creating public hostility toward them,
and the hostile policies of the government, such as those examined in this
Article, have all been important factors. 261 The permanent closure or
relocation of one unionized workplace of significant size is likely to inflict
a greater toll on the union involved than any loosening of resignation
restrictions. 2 62 But, as in many other areas of life, every little bit helps,
256 Interview with Clyde Summers, Mar. 18, 1988 (oral reflections on forty years of labor
law).
257 In the absence of such statistics, one can only infer that strikebreaking opportunities (or
other activities prohibited by union membership) were generally either not attractive or not
readily available in one's own trade and locale. See R. Hardin, supra note 88; text accompanying notes 89-96 supra. In turn, the absence of strikebreaking suggests that habits of mutuality
and the social sinews of solidarity remained powerful forces even after the Taft-Hartley Act.
258 Wellington, supra note 153, at 1041 n.106 (reporting only 4% of collective bargaining
agreements as having maintenance-of-membership clauses in mid-1970s).
259 After the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, union membership as a condition of employment under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA was "whittled down to its financial core." NLRB v.
General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). Workers now may be made to pay the union the
equivalent of an initiation fee and regular dues, but actual membership cannot be required
either to obtain or retain a job. This "financial core" affiliation is referred to as "agency membership." Id.
260 M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at 9-11 (35% figure); Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPS Survey July-Sept. 1987 (1988) (mid-1987 figure of 17%).
261 See generally M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at 8-22; notes 265-78 and accompanying text
infra.
262 The law, of course, may help or hurt here as well. In this context, consider the following
cases: First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981) ("Management
must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the
running of a profitable business"; economically motivated partial shutdown and release of
union employees held part of management prerogatives); Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (employer need not bargain over issues
"which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control" including automation and subcontracting
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and legal principles certainly make a considerable synergistic contribution to economic and social developments, whether by magnifying them
263
or by steering them.
2. Ideas and Interests in the New Economy: Principlesand Policies
a. A CapitalistCrisis and an Employer Offensive. Sometime in the
early to mid-1970s, legal principles and governmental policies, both economic and administrative, began to reinforce each other in opposition to
the solidarity interests of labor. Mired in stagftation, faced with the economic challenges and political indiscipline of our allies, burdened with
skyrocketing fuel and raw materials costs and Third World assertiveness,

and unable to register growth in either productivity or (for the moment)
profits, 264 public life in the United States entered a period hostile to labor
265
and its allies.
Unions became special targets of elite wrath because, in this new
global situation, increased costs could no longer simply be passed along
through higher prices in a captive market. After 1972, real wages in the
United States began a remarkable decline, one which has not seen them
rise above, and finds them today far below, the 1972 level. 266 Unions
were initially able to offer only some protection to their members; this,
however, was quite substantial in comparison to non-unionized employees. 267 This naturally increased employer antipathy and resistance to
out); Milwaukee Spring Div., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984) (in certain circumstances employer may follow through on threat to move plant away from union operation if mid-term
contract concessions are not granted), aff'd sub noma.UAW v. NLRB (Milwaukee Spring II),
765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). These decisions may well have far more deleterious consequences for unions and workers than the "resignation" and "strikebreaking" cases, but they
are all of a piece.
263 See Gould, supra note 36, at 941-42 (offering assessment of role of administrative and
court decisions in deterioration of union standing and weakened legitimacy of labor law system); Summers, supra note 20, at 31-35 (same); Weiler, supra note 20, at 1804-20 (same). See
generally Has Labor Law Failed, supra note 20 (same).
264 See Scott, U.S. Competitiveness: Concepts, Performance and Implications, in U.S.
Competitiveness in the World Economy 17-31 (B. Scott & G. Lodge eds. 1985) (detailing and
quantifying various factors and indices).
265 See T. Ferguson & J. Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics 78-113 (1986) (describing and documenting in detail contours of
crisis and many manifestations of its negative impact on labor); M. Goldfield, supra note 18, at
189-205 (documenting methods and assessing results of anti-union offensive of past fifteen
years).
266 In fact, the 1987 figure for average weekly earnings (non-agricultural) was lower than
for any pre-Reagan year since 1961. Economic Report of the President, Table B45, at 299
(Feb. 1988). Measured in constant 1977 dollars, the average weekly earnings figure was
$167.21 in 1961, $198.41 in 1972, $168.09 in 1982, and $169.28 in 1987. Id. There has been
no real "recovery"; real wages have declined since 1978. Id.
267 Calculating the "wage premium" for membership is a very difficult proposition. Some
commentators estimate that from 1970 to 1975 it stood at around 20% but that, as the crisis
deepened, it rose to 30% between 1975 and 1980. T. Ferguson & J. Rogers, supra note 265, at
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unions, which manifested itself, among other ways, in an explosion of
unfair labor practice filings, 2 68 a vast rise in union decertification elections,269 and the mushrooming of the anti-union consulting industry.27 0
It used to be thought that the decision to join or not to join a union
was the employee's, but no longer. A few figures demonstrate the scope
of the employer offensive. From 1960 to 1980, and despite only little
change in the number of annual NLRB elections, 27 1 the number of unfair
labor practice charges fied against employers rose four-fold, from 7723
to 31,281;272 the number of charges involving a firing for union activity
rose three-fold, from 6044 to 18,315;273 the number of workers awarded

backpay in this context rose five-fold from 3110 to 15,642;274 and the
number of workers ordered re-instated to their jobs rose five-fold as well,
from 1885 to 10,033.275 Union certification victory rates declined from
68% in 1955 and 61% in 1965 to 50% in 1975 and 48% in 1980,276 and

one leading scholar modestly attributes a quarter to a half of the decline
in union successes in NLRB elections to management opposition
alone.27 7 Meanwhile, elections to decertify existing unions have risen

dramatically in number and success rate. In 1960, 237 decertification
elections (decerts) led to the loss of 8700 employees by their unions; in
1965, 200 decerts produced losses of 4718; in 1975, 516 decerts yielded
losses of 13,849; in 1980, 902 decerts dislodged 21,200 workers from
their unions; and in 1983, 922 decerts eliminated 23,700 workers from
their unions' rolls. 278 Recently developed methods for deterring union
84.
268 See Freeman, Why Are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB Elections?, reprinted in Has
Labor Law Failed, supra note 20, at 389, 402-04 (discussing employer unfair labor practices
and their impact on unionization); Weiler, supra note 20, at 1776 (same).
269 See Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further 'Reflections on the Distinctive Character of
American Labor Laws,' 1989 Wis. L. Rev. - (forthcoming) (providing data on decertification
elections and results).
270 See C. Summers, supra note 24, at 409-23 (describing union prevention and busting).
See generally Has Labor Law Failed, supra note 20 (compilation of articles and data on these

issues).
271 See Freeman, supra note 268, at 389, 402-04.
272 Id.
273 Id.

274 Id.; Weiler, supra note 20, at 1776.
275 See note 269 supra. Matters have become "worse" since 1980 despite an increasingly
pro-employer Board; the current Board has ceased providing much of the data, however, so
precise post-1980 figures are difficult to compile.
276 Weiler, supra note 20, at 1776.
277 Freeman, supra note 268, at 411-13 (management policies are "a major cause of the slow
strangulation of private sector unionism").
278 Rogers, supra note 269. More telling, and far more frightening than the absolute numbers lost here, is the decline in union success rates. The employee retention rate (the number
of employees lost through decertification elections divided by the number of employees eligible
to have their union decertified) declined from 62.5% in 1965 to 41.9% in 1975 to 36.2% in
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participation in the United States are cheap and effective. In contrast,
the price of an employee's exercise of his or her legal rights has risen
rather high, 279 making the cheerleading in the United States for dissident
Polish trade unionists sound rather hollow.
In political discourse, it became an axiom of "common sense" that
organized labor was part of what was hurting the United States, constricting its productive forces and draining its human energies. Lawyers,
jurists, and scholars became part of this new discourse, sometimes with
an embarrassing blatancy, but almost always with more than ample financial support. 280 Precisely how deleterious labor's role was depended,
among other things, on the extent of a particular administration's ties to
organized labor. 28 1 In general, however, the deterioration of organized
labor's political and cultural standing proceeded apace with the decline
of its standing in the workplace.
b. The NLRB Offensive to 1980: PrecariousBalance. Doubtless,
the spirit of the times may be read in a host of labor decisions by both
veteran and recent judicial appointees. 2 82 And that spirit may also be
read, with considerably less mediation, in the more overtly political opinions of NLRB appointees. 283 The ebb and flow of NLRB assaults on
1984. Worse still, if one calculates employees lost through decerts as a percentage of the
number won through elections, the figures are: 1965, 1.4%; 1975, 6.6%; 1982, 27.8%; and
1983, 30.9%. Id.
279 See Freeman, supra note 268, at 404. Freeman notes that:
If one divided the number of persons fired for union activity in 1980 by the number of
persons who voted for a union in elections to obtain an indication of the risk faced by
workers desiring a union, one gets a remarkable result: one in twenty workers who
favored the union got fired.
Given the small percentage of voters who are activists, the price of exercising one's given legal
rights and the risks one faces are quite staggering.
280 In the area of legal theory, one might point to the rise of the law and economics school.
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 128, at 990 (vigorous and sharp extension of Posnerian market
logic "analysis" to unions and their monopoly effects). See generally T. Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality 116 (1984) (author's "educated guess" of corporate annual spending at end of
1970s on advocacy advertising and grass roots lobbying alone is $1 billion); R. Saloma, Ominous Politics: The New Conservative Labyrinth 24-137 (1984) (discussing well-financed activities that created new ideas of neo-conservative and neo-liberal think tanks, roundtables, etc.).
281 Although organized labor's ties to the Carter administration were weaker than to previous Democratic administrations, they were nevertheless stronger than the ties reflected in
either the Nixon or Reagan presidencies. See, e.g., H. Johnson & N. Kotz, The Unions 70-90
(1972).
282 As of October 1988, no fewer than 374 of 761 sitting federal judges had been appointed
since 1980. By the end of his term, President Reagan, employing extraordinarily rigorous
screening, will have appointed over half of all federal judges, one-fourth of them millionaires.
See Roberts, Reagan's Legions of Nominees Put His Own Stamp on the Judiciary, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 9, 1988, § 4, at 5.
283 See F. McCulloch & T. Bornstein, supra note 16, at 175-77 (NLRB appointments overwhelmingly reflect political and economic agendas of sitting presidents).
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union solidarity in the area of "resignation rights" and "union fines" may
be tracked in several key cases dating back at least to the Nixon
284
Board.
The constitution of the International Association of Machinists
(IAM) in effect in 1973 specifically prohibited former members from
strikebreaking. Did it compel engagement in concerted activity and violate the principles of voluntary unionism by compelling post-resignation
activity? The NLRB ruled this clause impermissible 285 because section 7
protected an individual's right to engage in legal post-resignation activity
of choice. 286 But this ruling left untouched the issue of whether any clear
and explicit restrictions on a member's freedom to resign might be
countenanced.
As the Nixon Board became the Carter Board, it shied away from
addressing such vexing questions and sought to resolve the cases brought
before it on narrower grounds, such as whether a member had adequate
notice and knowledge of his obligations. Where a member had no
knowledge or notice of a resignation restriction, he could not be bound
by it.287 This shifted an often cumbersome burden onto the union and
allowed even dubious statements of ignorance by a worker to open both
the exit door and the picket line. Similarly, through an invocation of
reasonableness, absolute and unduly restrictive as well as ambiguous and
vague provisions were held to be violations. 288 The Carter Board's standard for a permissible resignation restriction was one "narrowly tailored
284 Paul Levy provides a detailed study of the composition, goals, initiatives, and dynamics
of the NLRB since 1980, together with illuminating comparisons to other recent Boards.
Levy, supra note 16. The brief discussion here is meant only to highlight a single issue on a
broad canvas.
285 Local Lodge No. 1994, IAM (O.K. Tool Co.), 215 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974) (§ 8(a)(1)(A)
violated by union attempting to impose fine collectible in court for strikebreaking).
286 Id. at 653 (prohibition of post-resignation strikebreaking impairs "a former member's
Section 7 right to refrain from concerted activity [and] also is plainly contrary to Scofield's
requirement that union members be free to leave the union to escape membership conditions
that they consider onerous").
287 See, e.g., NLRB v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 6-578, 619 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1980),
enforcing 238 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1978); NLRB v. United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 601
F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979), enforcing 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977); NLRB v. IAM, Merrit Graham
Lodge, 575 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1978), enforcing 231 N.L.R.B. 727 (1977); Local 1384, UAW (ExCell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1977), supplementing and aff'g 219 N.L.R.B. 729 (1975);
see also Recent Development, Protecting a Union Member's Right to Resign, 38 Vand. L. Rev.
201, 211 (1985) (detailing these and other cases).
288 See Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Locals 32B & 88L, 250 N.L.R.B. 850 (1980) (absolute
prohibition on resignation unacceptable); San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 243
N.L.R.B. 147 (1979) (voiding unconditional strike-period ban on resignation solely at discretion of union local's officials); Engineers Union Local 444 (Sperry Rand Corp.), 235 N.L.R.B.
98 (1978) (resignation period limited to last 10 days of year or contract unduly restrictive);
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 170, 225 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1976) (sole discretion of local officials unacceptable).
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to the union's legitimate needs" for solidarity and discipline, but reasonable enough to accommodate the conflicting interests of the union and
the employee.28 9 The Carter Board's emphasis on procedure over substance, however, would not stand the test of time.
The precariousness of the pre-1980 Board position was perhaps best
captured in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor i).290 Once again a
Machinists' local constitution prohibited strikebreaking by any current
or resigned member of the union.2 91 Because the union made certain that
all its members were aware of the provision and informed that fines
would be imposed for its violation, the Board, for better or worse, was
deprived of the opportunity to invalidate it on "notice" grounds. 292 Instead, it followed the next-easiest path, which was to consider the clause
an impermissible restriction on post-resignation conduct, rather than a
restriction on resignation itself.293 The Ninth Circuit, however, refused
to grant enforcement and remanded the case to the Board on the grounds
that it had been "hypertechnical" and avoided the real issue.294 The
court's readiness to transcend the Carter Board's halfheartedness and
validate the union's clause-as it later did29 5-was not shared by Judge,
now Justice, Kennedy, who urged its invalidation. 29 6 With the funda-

mental "right to resign" question thus still unresolved, the Carter Board
departed, to be refashioned as the much less cautious Reagan Board.
c. Post-1980 Onslaught: Dalmo Victor II-The Board Rebuffed.
In Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor //),297 the holdover Carter
Board members acknowledged that a union could impose reasonable re289 Ex-Cell-O Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1051 (1977), supplementing and aff'g 219 N.L.R.B.
729 (1975) (clause limiting resignations to last 10 days of December followed by 60-day waiting period fails to meet standard); cf. Gould, supra note 21, at 86-91 (if given certain construction, clause would prohibit member from ever resigning); Wellington, supra note 153, at 104145 (abusive use by unions to control members frequent).
290 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
291 Id.
292 See note 287 and accompanying text supra.
293 Dalmo Victor I, 231 N.L.R.B. at 720-21. The two dissenters deemed the majority opinion a semantic evasion of the obvious "right to resign" question. Both dissenters would have
upheld the restriction as a reasonable application of a union's right to regulate its own internal
affairs under the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 724 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting); id. at 725
(Murphy, Member, dissenting).
294 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor I), 608 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1979),
denying enforcement to 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977).
295 See Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985); notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
296 Dalmo Victor !, 608 F.2d at 1222-23 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (because clause controlled
post-resignation conduct and was not direct and unambiguous restriction on resignation, it
should have been invalidated).
297 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982) (plurality opinion), enforcement denied, 725 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
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strictions on resignations for the sake of the orderly administration of
union affairs, but they insisted that such restrictions not distinguish between strike-period and non-strike-period resignations. 29 Thus, the
Board was willing to condone a union provision requiring a thirty-day
299
waiting period before a resignation could take effect.
The two Reagan appointees concurred only in the adverse result,
contending that any restrictions on resignation were barred as external
actions designed to interfere with employees' employment status and the
rights of ex-members. 3°° For the Reagan appointees, a union member
could become an ex-member at any time, and once he was an ex-member,
any union effort to control his conduct, even strikebreaking, by fines or
30
other sanctions, was an external infringement on individual freedom. '
For the new Board militants, the thirty-day waiting period was an unprincipled compromise, a fiction compelling thirty days of undesired continued union membership and subjugation to union discipline. 30 2 To
permit this, they believed, would be to place the interests of a union
above the basic policies of the NLRA 3 3-as if the NLRA had not been
primarily concerned with strengthening and rooting the collective inter3 °4
ests of workers through their unions.
The case returned to the Ninth Circuit, which again refused to enforce the Board's order. 30 5 Faced with the thirty-day weak compromise
position offered by the Carter Board members and the new militance of
its Reagan appointees, 30 6 the court sided with the Board's sole dissenter
and found the union rule reasonable and enforceable. 30 7 Courts, it said,
must allow a" 'wide range of reasonableness'" in assessing the policies of
Id. at 986-87.
299 Id. The plurality acknowledged, and was willing to endorse, two of the union's interests:
the union could maintain some solidarity during a strike, and the union could take care of
administrative affairs involved in resignations. Id.
The sole dissenter found the union rule altogether reasonable and protected by the internal governance and retention of the membership proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 993 (Jenkins,
Member, dissenting).
300 Id. at 987-88 (Van de Water, Chairman & Hunter, Member, concurring in the
judgment).
301 Id. at 989-90 (Van de Water, Chairman & Hunter, Member, concurring in the
judgment).
302 Id. at 991 (Van de Water, Chairman & Hunter, Member, concurring in the judgment).
303 Id. at 992 (Van de Water, Chairman & Hunter, Member, concurring in the judgment).
304 See notes 29-38, 103-27 and accompanying text supra.
305 Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB (Dalmo Victor 11), 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
306 Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984, 992 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Van de Water, Chairman & Hunter, Member, concurring in the judgment) ("Any union
rule that restricts a member's right to resign is unreasonable and any discipline taken by a
union against an employee predicated on such a rule violates Section 8(b)(l)(A)."), enforcement denied, 725 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
307 Dalmo Victor Ii, 725 F.2d at 1215, 1218; see notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
298
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the exclusive bargaining representative. 30 8 The court looked back to
Scofield v. NLRB 30 9 and its three crucial questions: whether the union
regulation "(1) reflects a legitimate union interest, (2) impairs no policy
Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and (3) is reasonably enforced
3 10
against union members?"
In regard to the first test, the court found it obvious that a legitimate
union interest was implicated, since post-resignation strikebreaking
eroded the union's base, unduly strengthened the employer's position,
and threatened the viability of the collective bargaining intended by the
311
NLRA.
In regard to the second test, the court endorsed the principle of mutual reliance and found it to be part and parcel of the NLRA. For a
union to fine those who seek to resign and break the strike is to enforce
the contract that emanates from mutual reliance. "There is little point in
taking a strike vote if the people who disagree with the outcome are free
to resign anytime and escape its effects." 31 2 Congress imbedded such
principles in the NLRA. What was not imbedded was the notion, put
forward by the new Board appointees, that there was a per se contradiction between the right to resign provided in section 7 and a union's right
3 13
reasonably to restrict resignations according to section 8(b)(1)(A).
The union, after all, had not altogether forbidden resignations or employment during a strike-it had only prohibited working for the same struck
3 14
employer during the same strike.
As for the third test, reasonable enforcement, the court realized that
enforcement was most essential during a strike, or when a strike was
imminent. These are precisely the times when the effectiveness and value
of a union are on the line. A union deprived of the ability to fine recalcitrants is disarmed before the employer. The court put it frankly: (former) members "may not betray their colleagues and expect to get away
308 Dalmo VictorII, 725 F.2d at 1216 (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 180 (1967)).
309 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
310 Dalmo Victor 11, 725 F.2d at 1216-17 (paraphrasing Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,
430 (1969)); see notes 195-203 and accompanying text supra.
311 Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217. The court confirmed that "a substantial number of
defections... once again give[s] the employer greater power to set the terms and conditions of
employment." Id.
312 Id.

313 See Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984, 986-87 (1982) (plurality opinion), enforcement denied, 725 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
314 Dissatisfied members enjoyed other options as well: they could seek to persuade their
fellow union members to end the strike; they could resign from the union and obtain other
work; they could move to replace the union leadership with those who shared their views; and
they could organize to decertify the union. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1218. They also

enjoyed other options not noted by the court. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
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without paying a price for weakening the collective bargaining environment. ' 315 And, unlike the Board, the court credited the understanding
that even the appearance of uncertain employee support of the union
would encourage employer obduracy. 3 16 The threat of expulsion from
the union, the court properly noted, was meaningless to someone who
had already decided to resign in order to return to work for the struck
employer. 317 The Ninth Circuit still took its labor law seriously.
d. Neufeld Porsche-Audi: The Courts Rebuffed, the Lines Drawn.
The Reagan Board enjoyed better luck in the Seventh Circuit. In Pattern
Makers' League (Rockford-Beloit),3 18 a union provision, nearly identical
to the one at issue in the Dalmo Victor cases,3 19 prevented members from
resigning during a strike or when one appeared imminent. 320 Pattern
Makers was thus born in the shadow of Dalmo Victor and treated identically by the Board, which invalidated the democratically adopted union
provision on precisely the same grounds it had offered earlier. 321 This
time, however, the circuit court condoned the Board's individualist perspective and treated the union and employee virtually as antagoniststhe free man intruded upon by a collectivity. 322
Machinists, Local Lodge 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi)323 arose in
the Ninth Circuit and involved another, practically identical union bylaw
penalizing resignation followed by strikebreaking. 324 Although the
Board as a national agency is entitled to resort to a circuit court virtually
315 Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1218 (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 180 (1967)).
316

Id.

317 Id.
318 265

N.L.R.B. 1332 (1982), enforced, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 473 U.S. 95

(1985).
319 See NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor I), 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979),
denying enforcement to 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977); Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) v.
NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985); text accompanying notes
284-98 supra.
320 See PatternMakers, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1332-34 (discussing "League Law 13" of the Pattern Makers' League); note 5 supra, notes 321-28 and accompanying text infra (text and background of constitutional provision).
321 Pattern Makers' League (Rockford-Beloit), 265 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1982), enforced, 724
F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). The grounds were that the restriction
distinguished between strike and non-strike periods and unreasonably restricted a union member's right to resign. See text accompanying notes 281-97 supra.
322 PatternMakers, 724 F.2d at 60 ("[Fjorced continued membership distorts the balance
between encouraging collective activities among workers [sic] and protecting individuals from
coercion.... An employee's decision to resign is personal; a union rule requiring retention of
membership cannot be considered merely an 'internal [organizational] matter'.").
323 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984).
324 Id.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 19881

UNION RESIGNATIONS

anywhere the company in question does business, 325 it chose in this instance simply to ignore the clear position taken by the Ninth Circuit and
to apply its own discredited analysis once again. In a sense, it arrogated
to itself the prerogative to resolve circuit splits by choosing the circuit
court favoring a position closer to its own explicit project rather than
326
adhering to the law of the circuit in which the controversy arose.
In Neufeld Porsche-Audi, the Board offered a truly remarkable and
singular interpretation of the NLRA. Because section 7 guarantees the
right to refrain from, as well as the right to participate in, concerted
action,3 27 the Act is neutral as between employees who might wish to
strike and those who might wish to break a strike. According to the
Board, it would be remiss in its oversight duties if it permitted a union
rule restricting resignations, because such a rule discriminatorily favors
striking workers over strikebreaking workers. 328 The institutional interests of the union were treated as if the union and the workers were fully
separate creatures, with the former having "institutional interests" of a
lower (and selfish) order, while workers enjoyed higher order section 7
rights as individuals. 329 By debasing the union as a mere "institution,"
the Board ignored not only the collectivist nature of the labor law but
3 30
also its majoritarian principles.
A decision based on majority rule could now simply be revoked by
the behavior of an often small minority of dissidents. The Board could
thus conclude that mere institutional interests (the union's desire for victory) can never negate express statutory rights (the strikebreaker's section 7 right to decide at any time to refrain).3 3 1 Freedom for the
individual, therefore, is not about making enforceable commitments
with, and to, one's peers, but rather proceeding in and out of the market
according to one's momentary disposition or need. The Board thus
staked out a position intended to undermine the judgment of the Ninth
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1982).
The Board is not automatically authorized to apply to the D.C. Circuit for enforcement,
and because "forum shopping" would be unseemly, the Ninth Circuit appears to have been the
most appropriate place for this case to be brought-if, given that court's earlier opinion in
Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), it was to be
brought at all. See Levy, supra note 16, at 341 n.373.
327 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
328 270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1330 (1984).
329 Id.
330 See notes 44, 105-06, 167 and accompanying text supra (discussing collectivist nature of
labor law); see also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 70 (1975) (union has "legitimate interest in presenting a united front... and in not seeing
its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by subgroups within the unit separately pursuing what they see as separate interests").
331 See Machinists, Local Lodge 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984);
notes 45-48, 205-11 and accompanying text supra.
325
326
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Circuit and to bring about a Supreme Court resolution of a conflict
332
among the circuits that the Board itself had helped to generate.
3.

Closing the Circle: The Pattern Makers Outcome

The Seventh Circuit closed its ruling enforcing the Board's decision
in Pattern Makers by throwing down a gauntlet. "We can discern no
qualitative difference between employees agreeing not to aid or abet a
company during a strike and a union rule forbidding resignations during
a strike. Indeed, the principal reason for a rule prohibiting resignations
during strikes is to insure that union members do not aid the company by
returning to work [for it]. ''333 The court continued in an accompanying
footnote, "it is the same thing to say that a rule prohibiting resignations
during strikes is designed to strengthen the union's power through strike
solidarity. 334 After so explicitly recognizing the union's interest in a rule
prohibiting resignations during the strike, the court concluded: "Employees should have the right to change their minds about remaining
335
members of the union."
The court thereby admitted that member/union relations were in
fact employee/employer relations. Yet it chose to disregard the manifest
and substantial subversion of those relations that strikebreaking brings
about. Strikebreaking, after all, contravenes the employer's duty to bargain in good faith with the employees' exclusive bargaining agent, 336 and
undermines, if not quite repudiates, even a minimal understanding of the
337
goals of the NLRA.
With the lines drawn and the issues constructed in this way-individual rights, deregulation, free choice, right to refrain, and freedom
from the coercion of one's fellows-the appearance of Pattern Makers
before the Supreme Court was, in terms of its themes if not its outcome,
almost anticlimactic. The Board, the Solicitor General, and those commentators who had contributed to the decline of the union image in the
public, elite environment together had secured the political, legal, and
economic positions.338 Indeed, the actual "Findings of Fact" delivered
332 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 469 U.S. 814 (1984) (granting certiorari).
333 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted),
aft'd, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
334 Id. at 61 n.3.
335 Id. at 61.
336 See notes 31-33, 114 and accompanying text supra (meaning of "duty to bargain").
337 For a discussion of these goals, see, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582 (1960) ("promote industrial stabilization"; "achiev[e] industrial peace"; maintain "uninterrupted production"); note 37 and accompanying text supra.
338 See notes 113-17 and accompanying text supra (discussing labor law sentiments of current Solicitor General); notes 264-81 and accompanying text supra (describing evolution of
public, elite opinion on labor); notes 282-332 and accompanying text supra (describing recent
Board initiatives before courts).
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by the administrative law judge at the outset of the case, and never contested thereafter, are quite shocking in light of the principles articulated
by the Board, accepted by the Seventh Circuit, and ultimately deferred to
3 39
by the Supreme Court.
These uncontested facts reveal a reality palpably absent from the
majority opinions of the NLRB and the Court. It is a reality in which
strikebreaking during prior strikes had led to work without a contract,
substandard terms of employment, and the like.34 ° The facts reveal a
league bylaw adopted democratically and pursuant to notice and to
which each union member took an oath.3 41 They reveal that all members
of the union but one attended the meeting where a secret ballot strike
vote was taken and that all strikers received strike benefits. 342 Ultimately, "[a]ccording to unrebutted testimony," on account of post-resignation strikebreaking, "the strike not only was prolonged but it became
necessary to accept a contract embodying substandard wages and
343
benefits."
For the Court, the question was a narrow one: "[W]hether the
Board's construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable" and whether it
could be construed as the Board had chosen to construe it. 344 Although
it engaged in textual interpretation of statute and precedent and tinkered
modestly with congressional history, 345 the opinion of the Court repeatedly returned to its duty of deference to the Board. Thus, "[w]here the
Board's construction of the Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected
'merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute.' ,,34
Furthermore, Justice Powell observed that "in related cases this Court
invariably has yielded to Board decisions," and he chose to close his
opinion with the following words: "We defer to the Board's interpretation of the Act and so affirm... enforcing the Board's order. ' 347 Further, the pivotal fifth vote for the decision came from Justice White, who
rested his opinion exclusively on deference to the Board and who confessed that, had the Board ruled in favor of the union, he would have so
339 Pattern Makers' League (Rockford-Beloit), 265 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1338 app. (1982)
(Wacknov, ALJ), enforced, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
340 Id. at 1338 app. ("[Tihe return to work of former members during the course of [previous] strikes resulted in the inability to negotiate successor contracts, the defunctness of associations [locals], and the acceptance of substandard terms" of employment).
341 Id.

342 Id. ("According to unrebutted testimony... [each striker was] receiving between $125
and $150 per week in benefits.").
343 Id.

344 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985).
345 Id. at 100-12.

346 Id. at 114 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)).
347 Id. at 115, 116.
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ruled as well.3 48
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by chastising the majority for
"supinely defer[ring] to [the Board's] divided-vote determination. ' 3 49 In
the course of his dissent, Justice Blackmun raised a number of the issues
and perspectives presented in this essay: the value of a worker's freelymade promise to his fellows, 350 the weight of democratic decision making, 35 1 the exclusive right of the union as an organization (as opposed to
its individual members) to strike or not to strike, the logic of collective
action, the language and intent of the statute and its framers, and the

general goals of labor law and policy. 352 The "moral economy" of labor
348 Id. at 117 (White, J., concurring). Justice White explained his concurrence as follows:
Where the statutory language is rationally susceptible to contrary readings, and the
search for congressional intent is unenlightening, deference to the Board is not only
By the same token, ho-ever, there is nothing in the
appropriate but necessary ....
legislative history to indicate that the Board's interpretation is the only acceptable construction of the Act, and the relevant sections are also susceptible to the construction
urged by the union .... Therefore were the Board arguing for that interpretation of the
Act, I would accord its view appropriate deference.
Id. at 117 (White, J., concurring).
349 Id. (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens also
dissented, stating simply that neither the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act nor the
plain language of the statute persuaded him that the right to refrain encompassed the right to
resign. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
350 In regard to promises and mutual reliance, Justice Blackmun noted that the majority
"understands voluntariness to mean freedom from enforceable commitment" rather than the
right to act collectively. Id. at 127 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For Blackmun, it was legitimate for a rule to "protect[ ] individual union members' decisions to put their own and their
families' welfare at risk in reliance on the reciprocal decisions of their fellow workers, and
further[ ] the union's ability to bargain with the employer on equal terms, as envisioned by the
Act." Id. at 128 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Far from being restricted by a rule such as the
union's, § 7 rights were vindicated by it: "Enforcement of a promise not to resign during a
strike... is a vindication of that [§ 7] right to act collectively and engage in collective bargaining .... " Id. at 130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun enunciated the logic of pristine
collective action:
Once an employee freely has made the decision to become a member of the union, has
agreed not to resign during a strike, and has had the opportunity to participate in the
decision to strike, his faithfulness to his promise is simply the quidpro quo for the benefits he has received as a result of his decision to band together with his fellow workers
and to join in collective bargaining.
Id. at 129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun even cited the Solicitor General (who represented the NLRB before the Court) on behalf of the proposition that "the principle of fidelity
to one's word is an ancient one." Id. at 133 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing C. Fried, Contract as Promise 2 (1981)).
351 At least in this instance, according to Blackmun, the union members were fully aware of
the promises they had made and the sanctions they would face. In addition, they enjoyed
numerous channels for persuasion, alternative employment, changing the union leadership or
policy, and the like. Id. at 132 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
352 Id. at 117-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The "moral economy" of solidarity in the labor
context and the text and history of Taft-Hartley implied a number of points: "When these
requirements [voluntariness and democratic procedures] of free association are met, the union
has the right to enforce such rules 'through reasonable discipline,' including fines.... Unless
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and law delineated by Blackmun was also quite like that expressed by the
First Circuit in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board 353 and the Ninth
Circuit in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II) v. NLRB.3 54 In concluding his dissent, Justice Blackmun decisively rejected the Board's and
Court's conception of employee autonomy:
In the name of protecting individual workers' rights to violate their
contractual agreements, the Court debilitates the right of all workers
to take collective action. The conclusion that freedom under the
NLRA means freedom to break a freely made promise to one's fellow
workers after they have relied on that promise to their detriment is not
labor law,
only a notion at odds with the structure and purpose of our 355
worker.
American
the
of
autonomy
the
to
affront
an
is
but
Thus, unlike the majority opinion, Blackmun's dissent reflects an awareness that individual autonomy itself flourishes in a positive social context.
More immediately, the Court's "affront" may also prove to be a lethal
injury if, as one commentator has put it, Pattern Makers produces "a
'356
graveyard of wrecked unions left beside a path of broken strikes.
The Board Vindicated?
It has been argued that what has prompted the recent evolution of
Board policy is anything but an interest in the "autonomy of the American worker. '3 57 Rather, so the argument continues, the Board has been
prompted by a commitment to free employers from the constraints of
4.

internal rules can be enforced, the union's status as bargaining representative will be eroded."
Id. at 118 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 181 (1967)). Blackmun continued, "The rule [in question] neither coerces a worker to
become a union member.., nor affects an employee's status as an employee under the Act."
Id. at 121 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "section 8 [does] not grant the Board the
authority to impair the basic right of all membership associations to establish their own reasonable membership rules." Id. at 126 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
353 446 F.2d 369 (Ist Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409, U.S. 213 (1972); see text accompanying notes
205-11 supra.
354 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985); see text accompanying
notes 297-317 supra.
355 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 133 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
356 Comment, supra note 33, at 527.
357 Levy, supra note 16, at 345. At the conclusion of his 125 page investigation of the
Reagan Board's activities and decisions, Levy notes that the Board's
invocation of 'individual rights' to bar union strike behavior rules contrasts with [its]
disregard for individual rights when the employee's interests are at stake, as well as with
...deregulatory impulses vis-A-vis employers.... [A] consistent theme runs throughout
the Reagan Board's decisions, a theme which belies the Board's rationalizations in terms
of individual rights, free choice and private resolution of disputes without undue government intervention. The moving force... is to free the employer from constraint by
workers and their organizations. The Board employs any rationale which advances employer power, or which weakens unions. But when a new pro-employee rule runs contrary to those same principles, the principles are not only discarded but even denounced
as irrelevant.
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workers and their organizations. In this effort, multiple approaches have
been utilized, including calls for individual autonomy and government
deregulation of contract relations-the return to the "market." But it
was precisely to the exigencies of the labor market that government initially responded, through the NLRA. 358 Employers naturally seek to
subject employees to their own regulation, not only by managing the organization and production of work at the workplace, 359 but, more generally, by undermining union strength and resubjecting workers to the
36
discipline of a competitive, commodity-like labor market. 0
Unions represent the chief impediment to the deregulation of the
labor market. Their influence is far more vexing to the advocates of an
unfettered free market economy than is the impact of statutory minima.36 1 Self-organization and concerted activity function precisely to
limit, resist, and redirect employer control. Absent government regulation in the form of labor laws aiding unions, a more exploitative and
oppressive regulation would assert itself, by employers and through the
362
market.
That of all agencies the NLRB-which has been no stranger to
politicization 363-should lose sight of this possibility has offended and
disturbed not just trade unionists, but also distinguished jurists. Thus, as
Senior Judge Swygert observed in a similar context, the current NLRB's
"off-hand dismissal" of unions' efforts to have their collective needs balanced against individual section 7 claims "evinces an unseemly hostility
against trade unionism." ' 364 Swygert's comparison of the Board's current
Id. at 390.
Another, more conservative scholar provides a curious, almost fanciful, example of the
current Board's notions of collectivity and coercion:
[I]n Teamsters Cannery Local No. 670 (Stayton Canning Co.) [275 N.L.R.B. 127
(1985)] the Board concluded that a union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by denying its
financial core [agency] members access to union-provided healthcare services. The
Board determined that it was of no significance that the benefits were outside the collective bargaining agreement. The Board reasoned that the denial had the foreseeable effect
of coercing members into joining the union as full members, in violation of their right to
refrain from doing so.
Comment, supra note 184, at 1434.
358 See notes 29-42, 96-125 and accompanying text supra.
359 See, e.g., H. Braverman, supra note 91, at 80-85; M. Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent,
supra note 91, at 77-178; M. Burawoy, The Politics of Production, supra note 91, at 21-84,
122-55; R. Edwards, supra note 91, at 48-71, 130-62.
360 See notes 55-84 and accompanying text supra.
361 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 55, at 1357-58 (arguing that all parties better off in at-will
type labor market); Fried, supra note 113, at 1020 (advocating loosening of union's claims over
members in favor of free choice and statutory minimum terms).
362 See 0. Kahn-Freund, supra note 40, at 81-83, 172; Brousseau, supra note 82, at 22-24;
notes 98-115 and accompanying text supra.
363 See note 16 supra (citing sources analyzing history and policies of Board).
364 UAW Local 1384 v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 482, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J.,
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approach with its traditional orientation is worth noting:
[T]he Board [now] adopts a false dichotomy between the union's institutional interests... and the section 7 rights of employees: on one side
of the scales are section 7 rights... on the other side of the scales is the
reified "union"-an alien institution with interests completely distinct
from the section 7 interests of the employees. Given this dichotomy,
the Board concludes that the institutional interests deserve no weight
.... A more tenable and traditional conception of the "union," how-

ever, is as a collection of employees who have chosen to exercise their
section 7 rights to organize and to pursue their common interests....
Therefore, an efficient union is both a manifestation of section 7 rights
and a means of securing those rights. It is very much the "business" of
efficient and effective
the Board, then, to "assur[e] that a union has an
'3 65
organization to conduct collective bargaining.
Determining the precise extent to which courts owe the Board deference may be impossible. Sentiment tends often to be outcome-driven,
dependent on one's affinities for the positions taken by a particular current Board. Nevertheless, as Justice Blackmun indicated, a Board's interpretation should not be" 'inconsistent with a statutory mandate or...
frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.' ",366 Board decisions are certainly not immune from review, particularly, it seems, when
they are too far ahead of, or behind, the thinking of other state apparatuses.3 67 In rejecting the Board's order in MachinistsLocal 1327 (Dalmo
Victor II) v. NLRB,3 68 the Ninth Circuit reasserted the position that
"' "the deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip
into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an
agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." ' "369
This Article does not explore the extent to which the NLRB or
other administrative agencies have been "captured" by their clientele (or
others) and used to scuttle the missions for which they were estabdissenting).

365 Id. at 496 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (quoting Gutton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B.
406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, IVE v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
366 Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 131 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965)).
367 See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166
(1971) (Board decisions not immune from judicial scrutiny). See generally International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961) (Board's discretion limited by its obligation
to adhere to congressional policies); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798
(1945) (Board's discretion in administering NLRA derives from need for flexibility); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 159-160 (1982).
368 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984).
369 Id. at 1215 (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 102 (1983) (quoting American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
318 (1965))); see also Allied Chem., 404 U.S. at 166 ("[W]e have never immunized Board
judgments from judicial review .... ).
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lished. 370 Nevertheless, it is simply untenable to claim that administration is separate from politics. 37 1 In any descriptively adequate sense, the
Board's recent choices have been highly political, 372 especially when it
has abandoned the domain of the "common law of the shop" in favor of
relatively undisguised partisan projects like industrial "competitiveness."
The current version of that particular project is an affront to the NLRA's
373
commitment to a context that allows for union growth and stability
and embeds into law and policy a right to effective collective strike
374
action.
5. Toward Reasonable Exit Timing
The logic culminating in PatternMakers and propagated by the current Board disdains the union's function as exclusive bargaining agent 375
and spurns the majority rule principle that the previous leading case,
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,376 considered "unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy. ' 3 7 7 The majority rule principle and the prerequisites for effective collective action constrain
individual employees in a number of ways. Among them is a necessary
restriction on the freedom to exit the collectivity at will in order to make
a separate deal with the employer as a strikebreaker. In "full awareness
that some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of
378
the majority," Congress endorsed the majority principle.
Employees within a single unit will always have divergent desires
and disparate interests. Bargaining over such differences constantly
takes place within the union, 3 79 and decisions in regard to undertaking or
370 There is a wide body of literature on regulatory and administrative agencies and their
"capture" by those whom they are to oversee. See, e.g., B. Mitnick, The Political Economy of
Regulation (1983).
371 See, e.g., C. Offe, supra note 72, at 88-119, 147-78, 207-19; N. Poulantzas, State, Power,
Socialism 217-31 (1978).
372 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (reviewing courts shall also "determine the meaning or appli-

cability of the terms of an agency action" and hold unlawful "actions, findings and conclusions
found to be" inadequate in one or more of a number of listed respects).
373 See Comment, supra note 83, at 343 (citing proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (1982)).
374 This commitment has been repeated by Congress even in its nominally anti-union legislation. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982) (Landrum-Griffin Labor Reform Act does not
"impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution").
375 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) ("[R]epresentatives designated or selected for purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees... shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit.").
376 388 U.S. 175 (1967).

377 Id. at 180.

378 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339 (1953).
379 See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 76, at 84; notes 73-80 and accompanying text supra.
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continuing a strike, though potentially more costly than others, are qualitatively no different. "[S]ubject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of [a union's] discretion," Congress
thought it clear that "[tlhe complete satisfaction of all who are represented [in that union] is hardly to be expected. ' 3 0 The majority principle is, of course, subject to a well-elaborated panoply of procedural and
substantive protections for individuals and minorities.3 8 1 Within those
protections, however, section 7 rights are "collective rights, rights to act
in concert... protected not for their own sake but as an instrument" to
further a positive social good: collective bargaining. 382 To grant a minority of dissatisfied union members-those who would be strikebreakers-such disproportionate power at the key moment of a strike is to

undermine the majority principle altogether.
Congress's repeated reluctance to interfere with internal union rules
marked a recognition of the contractual, solidaristic, and mutualistic nature of unions and their "self-government." 383 Resignation itself, how38 4
ever, is not entirely an internal affair; it is a mixture of voice and exit,
and occupies a liminal status. Yet resigning is not like joining: the picture looking outward from inside is very different from the picture look-

ing inward from outside. "Voluntarism" assumes a higher order value
before entering and participating than it can possibly assume in contemplation of exiting. Indeed, exercising the right to join generates reliance
and constitutes a partial waiver of the right to refrain.3 85 Still, for the
benefit of all concerned, all terms and conditions of membership should
be fully known to would-be members, including the possible timing and
386
means of resignation.

380 Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 339.
381 See notes 7-10, 162-84 supra. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(h)(1)(A) (1982) (union may
not coerce employee in exercise of § 7 rights); 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982 & Supp. I 1984)
(providing extensive "bill of rights" for union members). But see Wellington, supra note 153,
at 1042-59 (asserting inadequacy of existing guarantees).
382 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975);
see notes 97-116, 148-60, 223, 320-21 and accompanying text supra.
383 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181, 184 (1967) (noting with regard to § 8(b)(1)(A) that Congress explicitly eschewed "any intention to interfere with union
self-government or to regulate a union's internal affairs"); see also United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 117 (1982) (Congress "believed that only essential standards should be
imposed by legislation, and that in establishing those standards, great care should be taken not
to undermine union self-government"). Sadlowski, like the Emporium Capwell dissenters, was
an insurgent from the left and therefore not a likely candidate for judicial beneficence.
384 See A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) (outlining three potential responses
for individuals in situations they find unsatisfactory).
385 See, e.g., NLRB v. Granite State Joir Bd., 446 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409
U.S. 213 (1972); see also notes 205-11 and accompanying text supra.
386 See Gould, supra note 21, at 106 (making all responsibilities and liabilities clear would
encourage faint-hearted to drop out, reducing divisions and allowing loyal to advance without
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To grant employees a limitless freedom to resign during a strike, or
when one appears imminent, is so obviously to impair the employees'
collective interest to the advantage of the employer that it must be considered different and apart from the simple right to exit. The strike is
"the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal. ' 387 It works to foster both collective bargaining and union democracy-the former by compelling employers to take their workers' needs seriously, the latter by providing the
experience of identity formation and collective action. Surrogate unionbusting is not in the national interest of the citizenry; but meaningful
individual freedom is, and it should not be lightly restricted. Only at the
point where realization of substantial group interests is placed in jeopardy3 88 may resignation and exit be restricted.
That point is reached when the negotiation of a new contract is announced or begins. If adequate notice of the timing of the start of negotiations has been provided to all known members, then it should remain
permissible to fine those who violate union constitutions, bylaws, and
regulations thereafter, even if they declare their resignation. Their resignations should be ineffective. A union's need "to protect against erosion
[of] its status . . . is particularly vital when its members engage in
strikes. '389 The presence of that possibility on the horizon necessitates
that the authority of the collectivity enjoy preeminence. The fronts have
been drawn and the quintessential confrontation with the employer has
begun. The requisite threshold, as described by the Court, has been
reached: a valid union interest, reflecting policies embedded in labor law
and policy, and reasonably applied and enforced. 3 9 Furthermore, Professor Gould is certainly right to propose that Congress authorize a
union security clause "that compels union membership when the union is
involved in negotiations which may culminate in the use of economic
' 39 1
pressure."
Workers at a struck facility are rarely compelled to display enthusiasm for strikes about which they feel ambivalent. Neither continued
laggards).

Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181.
See id. at 180-81 (noting importance of protecting against erosion at strike times).
389 Id. at 181.
390 See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74
(1973); notes 190-200 and accompanying text supra. As one observer has explained it:
The preservation of strike solidarity is clearly a valid union interest. Far from subverting an overriding congressional purpose embedded in the labor laws, union resignation restraints comport with the scope of union authority approved by the Congress
during the Taft-Hartley debates. Finally, when such resignation constraints are limited
to the strike period and are combined with informational safeguards, their enforcement
is reasonable.
Comment, supra note 83, at 369 (footnotes omitted).
391 Gould, supra note 21, at 113.
387
388
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membership in a union on strike, nor a complete ban on strikebreaking
compels maximum forms of participation in concerted action. In fact, as
repeatedly noted, democratic procedures for altering the course of events
from within the union are guaranteed by statute and enforced by the
courts. What the disenchanted employee should simply not be free to do
is to make his own personal deal with the struck employer by deserting
his association and strikebreaking. Unions should not be required to tolerate such activity on the part of those who previously enjoyed the benefits of membership and were members at the time efforts to negotiate a
new contract began.
CONCLUSION

The duty to bargain collectively and in good faith with labor's exclusive representative is the chief burden placed on employers by the entire
body of American labor law. 392 Leaving aside entirely any possible com-

pulsion to treat "good faith bargaining" substantively-indeed, making
the minimalist assumption that this requirement is procedural only-it
remains clear that an employer evades that responsibility when he is permitted to employ either current or former union members to break a
strike and assault their association. Whether or not they are still enrolled
union members, employees should not be allowed to enter into separate
deals with an employer by breaking the strike called by their exclusive
representative and working on terms and conditions to which the union
has not agreed.
A.

Resignations

Resignation from the union after the commencement of bargaining
for a new contract may itself be permissible as a matter of voluntary
unionism. At least for now, it has been so deemed. Such resignation
might, however, also be considered a waivable right where union mem392 Labor relations systems outside the United States have, of course, solved the problems
discussed here differently. What is striking about the United States is that there is government
involvement, but it does not go all the way. There are countries quite like our own in which
unions are not the exclusive agency for enforcing wage bargains. It is entirely reasonable for
"wage output" to float independently of the outcome of any particularlabor struggle. The
resignation and strikebreaking problems discussed in this Article are to a considerable extent
generated by the American exclusivity principle. Exclusivity would not be so central if political mechanisms carried some of the freight. For example, leading wage agreements could be
generalized through government action by the legislature or the executive. This often happens
in West Germany and Italy through extension laws. Such extension laws allow individuals to
enter and exit unions without severe consequences, making compulsory membership and exclusivity questions less important. See generally A. Sturmthal, Contemporary Collective Bargaining 327-34 (1957); M. Weiss, Labor Law and Industrial Relations in the Federal Republic
of Germany 128-29 (1987); Bok, supra note 30, at 1409, 1436-38; Ramm, The German Law of
Collective Agreements, in Labour Relations and the Law 84-91 (0. Kahn-Freund ed. 1965).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1268

bers have knowingly and voluntarily joined unions whose democratically
adopted constitutions or bylaws restrict possible resignation timing. In
any event, the onset of union-employer contract negotiations is the culmination of an associational process and marks the last possible moment
at which resignation from the union would not destroy that process. In
principle, a maintenance of membership rule, requiring a member to remain a member until a new contract is signed, is the solution to the Pattern Makers problem offering the greatest fidelity to the central goals of
the Act. 39 3 There is no persuasive reason not to reinstitute it.394 It has in
the past worked to provide stability and fairness and could do so again.
In the meantime, absent its explicit presence in a collective agreement,
the NLRB and courts should consider it a section 9(a), 395 J.L Case396type unfair labor practice for employers to "hire" strikebreakers who
were union members at the time unsuccessful contract negotiations
began.
B.

Post-ResignationStrikebreaking

The community ties that once engendered high levels of organic solidarity among workers in the United States have weakened. The NLRA,
especially section 9(a), was meant to reflect those ties and give them enduring legal substance within a collectivist framework that balanced the
interests of employers and employees. The doctrine of "mutual reliance," evaluated favorably by the First Circuit in Granite State,397 and
the Ninth Circuit in Dalmo Victor 11398 is surely an important one: once
the bargaining process has begun, the two sides are locked in the central
and characteristic form of collective encounter. Mutual reliance is a
long-term as well as a short-term relationship. It does not begin at the
moment a strike begins, a strike vote is taken, or negotiating teams sit
down to talk. Rather, it is embedded in the workplace and in the perforce social and cooperative nature of industrial production. 399 It requires that those employees who are members of the union at the time
393 See notes 151-60 and accompanying text supra.
394 See notes 153-59 and accompanying text supra.
395 Section 9(a) of the NLRA reads: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees ... shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. ..
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982); see notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
396 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).

397 NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., 446 F.2d 369, 372 (lst Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213
(1972).
398 Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB (Dalmo Victor II), 725 F.2d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir.
1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 901 (1985).
399 See note 91 supra.
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the negotiation process is begun not be permitted to work for the struck
employer until the strike in question has been settled.
It is obviously in the employer's interest to hire strikebreakers, and
his ability to do so and to continue to operate is well-rooted in the labor
law of the United States.4oo But to hire as strikebreakers (former) members of the union is not simply to continue operating. It is not even simply to hire the best-trained and skilled workers available. It is, as the
First and Ninth Circuits recognized, 401 a direct attack on the union. It is
a direct and impermissible attack on all the workers at the plant in question. For what it seeks to do is to demoralize them as a collectivity by
buying them out individually. This reaches far beyond hiring replacement workers. In hiring as strikebreakers (former) members of the union,
an employer is interfering with the union-member contract and seeking
to induce its breach. He is interfering with an advantageous relationship,
seducing in an effort to bring about something analogous to an alienation
of affections. Such an employer is saying to the employee: come, let us
together break bread-and the union. The result is the "destruction of
the collective and.., a recurrence of the naked weakness of the individual employee."'14 2 And that is not individual freedom or autonomy. It
is, rather, precisely the situation the NLRA, for all its revisions and interpretations, has meant to prevent.
Labor law requires significant worker solidarity rights. Over half a
century ago, Kahn-Freund noted that for labor law to function democratically in a private enterprise economy it had to
start from the premise that a struggle takes place within the framework
of the legal system, and that this struggle, as a conflict between parties
of potentially equal strength... produces a result which is susceptible
to legal regulation. The system of competition fails where one of the
...parties achieves such a superiority that to engage in [the system]
would be pointless.
Now it goes without saying that inside the capitalist economic
system there exists a natural disequilibrium in favor of the employers'
side through their ownership of the means of production and their con4°3
trol of jobs.
Labor's solidarity rights and expectations are essential to preserving the
equilibrium necessary for labor law to function in societies like our own.
Solidarity is too universal an aspect of production and too central to the
400 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938); see notes 23-24 and
accompanying text supra.
401 GraniteState, 446 F.2d at 372; Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1217.
402 Brousseau, supra note 82, at 23.
403 0. Kahn-Freund, supra note 40, at 172.
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needs of working people to be removed from the law.
Perhaps more importantly, a democratic society committed to affording the potential for human development requires solidarity rights.
Few. would dispute the obvious but essential fact that "we need other
people to create the conditions under which we can flourish as social
beings ... ."404 Hence we recognize the workplace associations called
trade unions. But we generally remain wary of whatever smacks of conscription and we call for individual autonomy. This Article has argued
that the current assault on unions not only misconceives relations of production but carries with it a severe and dangerous misconstruction of the
meaning of individual worker autonomy. The prevailing logic and approach sacrifice the real interests of workers to an abstract, decontextualized, and ideological conception of the right to autonomy4° 5-one which
leads to preferring the rights of strikebreaking workers over those striking workers. In the social and material world, however, it is otherwise;
powerlessness in the face of the market is not freedom, and an individual
employee's maximization of his commodity value is not the exercise of
sovereign choice. Any positive conception of autonomy must recognize
that its chief value lies in the contribution that it may make "as a means
or instrument or collective self-determination. '"'4 6 Separated from effective collective self-determination, autonomy is a virtue primarily for
those whose empowerment is already assured by substantial material
security.
Tushnet, supra note 14, at 1392.
On the artifactual and ideological way in which status quo relations, especially market
relations, are treated as natural and free, see P. Bourdieu, supra note 57; A. Giddens, supra
note 57; R. Hoggart, supra note 57. For a discussion of approaches that seek to break away
from status quo baselines without surrendering to naked group preferences, see Sunstein,
Locler's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 875, 906-07, 918-19 (1987).
406 Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1410 (1986) (emphasizing
hidden costs of an unrestricted regime of autonomy).
404
405
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